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Abstract
The primary purpose of the present study was to determine the
effects of threat frequency and contingency on game-playing behaviour
in a threat-vulnerable game. A second purpose was to determine the
stability of these effects when strategies were altered during
the final 75 trials of the game.

Threat was operationally defined

as the use of a particular choice in a threat-vulnerable game.
One hundred students enrolled in undergraduate courses at Wilfrid
Laurxer University played in one of nine programmed strategy
conditions:

all possible pairwise orderings of a passive, demanding

contingent, and a demanding noncontingent strategy.

The latter

two strategies were yoked to one another and therefore differed
only with respect to the contingency of threat.

The passive strategy

differed from the two demanding strategies in that the programmed
opponent never used the available threat. Results indicated that
both threat frequency and threat contingency had significant effects
on the Column player's behaviour.

However, the effects of contin-

gency were observed earlier in the interaction sequence. In
addition, delayed strategy effects were only obtained for the
contingency variable.

Postexperimental questionnaire data revealed

that, contrary to previous reports, attributions of incompetence and
foolishness were not necessary conditions for an exploiter to take
advantage of a passive opponent.
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Introduction
Game theory is one form of mathematical analysis of social
phenomena, the foundations of which were laid by Von Neuman and
Morgenstern (1944).

Few repercussions were immediately felt in

the social sciences because formal game theory is concerned with
deriving the rational solutions to various games rather than
examining the actual behaviour of players. To date, the theory
has been put to use by political scientists, economists, and
psychologists.
The psychologist is interested in answering the question,
"What determines how people play?"
question

One method of answering this

is to manipulate a situational variable; the strategy of

one of the players. When such a "player's" choices are predetermined
by the experimenter and presented to the real player by a confederate, computer or by the experimenter himself, such sequences are
called programmed strategies.

The real participant is usually

induced to believe that these programmed strategies are actual
choices made by another person because participants play differently
against a computer, although the opponent's strategy in both cases
is identical (Orcutt & Anderson, 1977).
There is a number of different types of strategies, including
contingent and noncontingent strategies. A contingent strategy
relies upon the responses of the real player in determining what
choice is delivered on a particular trial.

Such choices, as

delivered by the programmed opponent, are said to be conditionalized
on the responses of the real player.
1

In contrast, a noncontingent
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strategy delivers choices regardless of the responses made by
the real player. A further distinction lies between concurrent
and delayed strategy effects, a distinction first made by Oskamp
(1971) in a comprehensive review of programmed strategy effects in
mixed-motive games.

Concurrent effects are those observed while

strategies are continuing.

Delayed strategy effects are observed

once two or more different strategies have been discontinued, e.g.,
two groups receive different strategies initially, then both are
treated identically for the remainder of the game.
Oskamp's (1971) review indicated that the organization or
patterning of programmed input had a much greater effect on participants' responses than the overall level of reinforcement
provided.

That is, in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, studies have

shown that contingent strategies produce higher levels of cooperative responding than noncontingent strategies having the same
overall level of programmed cooperation.

However, Oskamp (1971)

also noted that the structure of the conflict situation must be
regarded as a major factor in any general theory of conflict.
Empirical studies have indicated that different effects are sometimes produced when similar variables are manipulated in strategically different games.
The present research was undertaken to examine the effects
of contingent versus noncontingent strategies in a mixed-motive
game which is strategically different from the Prisoner's Dilemma
game:

Game 21 in Rapoport and Guyer's (1966) taxonomy of 78 two-

person, two-choice games.

Unlike the Prisoner's Dilemma game,

3
Game 21 has a payoff structure which is asymmetrical for the two
participants.

If both players select their dominant response, one

player (Column) receives his most preferred payoff, while the other
player (Row) receives his next-to-least preferred payoff. In
order to induce the Column player to select his non-dominant
response such that the Row player can obtain his most preferred
payoff, the Row player may choose to employ his own non-dominant
response.

Such a response by the Row player is viewed as a tacit

threat to the Column player because Column would obtain his own
next-to-least preferred payoff if the Row player unilaterally
shifts from his dominant to non-dominant response.
Previous research using this game has indicated that the
use of threat by the Row player (i.e., the choice of his nondominant response) is successful in gaining concessions from Column
and arriving at a more jointly equitable distribution of payoffs
(Guyer & Rapoport, 1970).

Two studies which have compared passive

strategies (non-use of threat by Row) to demanding strategies (use
of threat by Row depending upon the specific sequence of Column's
responding) have indicated that the Column player will select his
non-dominant response more frequently when playing against a
demanding contingent strategy than against a passive strategy
(Gruder & Duslak, 1973; Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al.,
1976).

In addition, Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al.,

1976) reported that the probability of the Column player selecting
his non-dominant response after both players had selected their
dominant responses (i.e., appeasement) was higher when Column
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was playing against a demanding contingent strategy than against
a passive strategy.
While these studies clearly demonstrated that a demanding
contingent strategy is more effective than a passive strategy in
gaining concessions from the Column player, they do not indicate
whether the organization or patterning of threats is the major
factor or whether it is just the occurrence of threats irrespective
of their patterning which is important in gaining concessions
from the Column player.

The primary purpose of this research

was to determine the relative effects of the patterning of threats
(i.e., contingency) as opposed to the mere occurrence of threats
(i.e., frequency).

This was accomplished by the inclusion of a

demanding noncontingent strategy.

The demanding contingent and

demanding noncontingent strategies were yoked to one another and
therefore differed only with respect to the contingency of threat
(i.e., the frequency of threat was identical).

The passive

strategy differed from the two demanding strategies in that the
programmed opponent never used the available threat. Therefore,
the passive strategy differed from the demanding noncontingent
strategy in threat frequency alone. A comparison of the concurrent
effects of these three strategies permitted an assessment of the
independent contributions of threat frequency and of threat
contingency to gaining concessions from the Column player,
A second purpose of the present study was to determine
the effects of shifts in these three strategies on the behaviour
of the Column player during the last 75 trials of the game. There
are no studies in the literature which have examined the effects of
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strategy shifts in threat-vulnerable games and an examination
of these effects would establish boundary conditions for the threat
contingency or threat frequency variables.

For example, if threat

contingency is the prime determinant of gaining concessions from
the Column player during the initial 75 trials, would this also
be the case during the final 75 trials regardless of the strategy
experienced initially or would exposure to the initial strategies
moderate the effects of threat contingency during the final 75
trials?

Answers to questions such as these were provided by an

examination of the effects of strategy shifts.
In order to accomplish these objectives, participants
in the present study played in one of nine programmed strategy
conditions:

all possible pairwise orderings of a passive, demanding

contingent, and a demanding noncontingent strategy.

Six of the

strategy conditions involved a shift in strategy following 75
trials of the game while, for the remaining

three strategy conditions,

the programmed strategy remained the same for the entire duration
of the game (150 trials).
The following extensive review of the literature is intentionally general.

It is presented to serve as a bibliographic directory

for those readers interested in areas other than the topic of this
paper but also to serve to illustrate the wide range of questions
to which experimental games have been applied.

The reader who is

primarily interested in the specific research undertaken in this
paper is invited to turn to page 57.

Review of the Literature

Overview of Game Theory
Game theory employs as its basic model the game of strategy
as distinct from the game of chance.

To play a game against dice or

nature is to make decisions under conditions of risk or uncertainty,
a situation for which probability theory alone is a valuable tool.
Yet sometimes we must make our decisions with respect to what we
predict others will do, for the outcome is dependent not upon us
alone but upon the combination of two or more persons' choices of
action.
Therefore what distinguishes games from nongames
from the point of view of game theory . . . is
whether certain choices of actions and certain outcomes are unambiguously defined, whether the joint
choices can be precisely specified, and whether the
choosers have distinct preferences among the outcomes .
(Rapoport & Chammah, 1965, p. 17)
A game theorist is interested in the following question:
Given a particular game, what is the best way to play in order to
maximize the minimum gain and minimize the maximum loss?

This is

a purely mathematical question which is based on the assumption
that both players are rational. When both players are rational
and choose their best strategies according to the dictates of
formal game theory, the outcome is predetermined and nonindicative
of anything other than the ability of the players to foresee all
possible outcomes.
6
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The theory is considered to be a normative rather than a
descriptive model of behaviour because it prescribes how a rational
player should play a game.

Downing (1975) has attempted to inte-

grate the prescriptive and descriptive models of behaviour by first
deriving the rational solutions against various strategies of a
simulated other in Prisoner's Dilemma games, and then examining
how closely the behaviour of players in prior research conforms to
the prescribed optimal strategies.
Games involving two people with two choices each ( 2 X 2
games) have most commonly been used as research tools.

All such

games can be represented in the general matrix form presented in
Figure 1.

Both players usually make choices simultaneously which

determine the quadrant outcome (1, 2, 3 or 4).

Outcomes are ex-

pressed in the form, RICl, Row's choice always appearing first.
By convention, the payoff to the Row player on a particular trial
is placed in the lower left of each quadrant.
in the upper right.

Column's payoff is

By altering the relationships among the para-

meters a, b, c,and d, various games can be created.
Some games are classified as zero-sum games.
the sum of the payoffs in each quadrant is zero.
consists of maximizing one's own payoff.

In such games

Rational behaviour

In zero-sum games, maxi-

mizing one's own payoff necessarily minimizes the payoff to the
other player.

Therefore a rational player will play strictly com-

petitively because the interests of the two players are diametrically opposed.

There are two classes of zero-sum games: games with

8

Column (1)
CI
C2

\

R1

b,
ba N.

Row (2)
R2

\ .

c,

\

d,

Figure 1. General Matrix Form

9
a saddlepoint and those without.

A saddlepoint is an entry in a

matrix in which the payoff to the Row player is simultaneously a
minimum in its row and a maximum in its column.

Figure 2 displays

these two types of zero-sum games.
In zero-sum games with a saddlepoint the best two rational
players can do is to choose the strategy which contains the saddlepoint (Rapoport, Note 1). Row, if rational, will select Choice 2
in such a game because +6 is the best of the worst payoffs. Likewise, a rational Column player will select Choice 1 using the identical logic. When these two choices are made, the outcome is the
quadrant containing the saddlepoint (R2cl).

Choosing a response

on the basis of minimizing one's own losses and maximizing one's
own gain is referred to as the minimax principle. The principle
constitutes a general solution for all two-person zero-sum games
with a saddlepoint.
Zero-sum games without a saddlepoint must be solved in a
different manner:
best strategy.

The minimax principle no longer dictates the

A solution to such a game requires selecting either

Choice 1 or 2 with certain probabilities.

This is known as a mixed

strategy in contrast to choosing on the basis of the minimax principle, a pure strategy.
Of more interest are games in which the interests of the
players are partially opposed and partially coincident (nonzerosum or mixed-motive games).

These games stand partway on the con-

tinuum from the simple to the more complex games. Not only conflict

10

Column
CJ

Row

Q2.

\-4 \ 2
R1 4 \ -2
\
\-6 \-8
R2 6 \
8 \
A.

Zero-sum Game with
Saddlepoint

Column
C1
C2

Row

\ 4 \-6
R1
-4 \ 6 \
\-8 \ 2
R2
8 \ •2
\
B.

Zero-sum Game without
Saddlepoint

Figure 2. Two Zero-Sum Games

11
between players but conflict within players becomes evident as each
may be torn between cooperation for the common good and competition
aimed at satisfying personal interest.

Given that rational beha-

viour consists of making as many points for oneself as possible,
what is the rational choice in such a game?

Figure 3 displays the

general matrix form of the Prisoner's Dilemma game or Game 12 in
Rapoport and Guyer (1966) and also a Prisoner's Dilemma game matrix
in which actual payoff values have been assigned.
noted that Game 12 is a symmetrical game.

It should be

The motivational struc-

ture is identical for participants playing in the position of Row
or Column.
The relationship among the payoff parameters must satisfy
the following:

(a) S < P < R < T , and (b) 2R> S + T, in order for the

game to be called Prisoner's Dilemma.

The second condition is

necessary in order to preserve the Rlcl outcome as the cooperative
outcome.

Otherwise players may take turns at obtaining T, the

temptation or largest payoff.
In a Prisoner's Dilemma game both players possess a dominating strategy.

This is a strategy in which a player can expect to

do no worse and generally better regardless of the strategy chosen
by the other player.

For example, in Figure 3B, Column's domina-

ting strategy is Choice 2 because 5 is better than 3 and 1 is
better than 0.
2.

Likewise, Row's dominating strategy is also Choice

The individually rational choice, then, for both players, is to

play Choice 2.

If both do so, both receive 1 unit.

This outcome,

Column
CI
C2 ,

T,
R\ s,\
\s, X R
R2
R1

Row

R. X

\

T. \
A.

P

»

\

General Matrix Form
S < P < R <T
2R> S + T

Column
CI
C2
R1

Row

\

3 \

5

0 \
3\
X 0 \ 1
R2 5
X 1 \
B.

Matrix with Values
Assigned

Figure 3. Prisoner's Dilemma Game
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R2C2, is a strongly stable equilibrium, so called because neither
player can unilaterally depart from it without diminishing his own
payoff.

Notice, however, that RlCl would result in greater pay-

offs to both players.

This outcome is not an equilibrium.

If

Column or Row should unilaterally depart from the RlCl outcome, he
can gain a larger payoff.

Therefore, a dilemma exists between col-

lective and individual interests.

The Rl or Cl choices are labelled

cooperative responses.
Games with three or more players differ radically from the
two person games.

One of the basic functions of n-person game

theory is to give precision to the concept of potential power.

A

player can obtain a minimum payoff without joining any other, yet
to obtain more he must form a coalition with at least one other
player.

Sometimes it is advantageous to join with a powerful

player but if this should not be possible, a coalition with an impotent player in some games may aid in the maximization of gain.
Thus, each player has some potential power which, with cooperation
from others, may be realized.

Since no sufficient theoretical

model based on two-person game behavior has been built, it does not
seem particularly fruitful to discuss n-person game theory but only
to acknowledge its existence.
Psychological Uses of Experimental Games
A psychologist uses experimental games in an attempt to develop an empirical descriptive model of behaviour in conflict situations rather than a normative model of optimal behavior which as-
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sumes that both players are rational.

The experimenter is primarily

concerned with the question; What will happen when . . .? He is
not usually interested in finding the best solution to the game.
In general, studies indicate that players depart from the rational
solutions prescribed by formal game theory (Guyer & Rapoport, 1970;
Lieberman, 1960; Payne, 1965; Rapoport, Guyer, & Gordon, 1971;
Tyszka & Grzelak, 1976).

Psychological, sociological, and cultural

factors can be assumed to be responsible for these departures.
To the psychologist, the experimental game offers a unique
method of examining how various factors affect the decisions made
in conflict situations.
dependent variable:

Some psychologists view the game as a

They view the strategy choices of the partici-

pants as indicative of how persons with certain personality characteristics respond to real life conflicts.

Hence, some research

has been directed to the questions of how race (Knight & Mack, 1973),
personality patterns (Bennet & Carbonari, 1976; Gillis & Woods,
1971), or nationality (Rapoport et
choices.

al., 1971) affect strategy

In such investigations the crucial element is how closely

the game resembles the real life situation (Rapoport, Note 1).
Guyer and Rapoport (1972) see this particular use of experimental
games as a manifestation of the traditional approach to the study
of behaviour insofar as characteristics of individuals are seen as
the prime determinants of the way in which he or she chooses among
alternatives.
Rather than attribute gaming behaviour Lo cliar.icl <r i sL i <••: of
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the individual, one can view the data as a consequence of the immediate environment.

From this point of view, it is not absolutely

necessary that the game closely resemble some situation in real
life, for a model of behaviour can be constructed and related to
data generated by the manipulation of factors within that environment (e.g., the matrix, the use of a simulated other, "one shot"
versus iterated plays, etc.).

In other words, the treatment of the

gaming environment as an independent variable may lead to a model
based upon responses which are contingent upon the reinforcement
structure of the situation.
Despite the availability of 78 strategically different games
(Rapoport & Guyer, 1966), psychologists have been preoccupied with
the Prisoner's Dilemma game.

This preoccupation is reflected in

most reviews of the experimental gaming literature (Gallo & McClintock, 1965; Nemeth, 1972; Oskamp, 1971; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965;
Rapoport & Orwant, 1962) although increasingly reference is being
made to strategically different games (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977;
Rapoport, Guyer, & Gordon, 1976; Schlenker & Bonoma, 1978).
Variables in Experimental Games
"Gaming behaviour" is a general term representing a large
number of very specific dependent variables.

There is a preponder-

ance of Prisoner's Dilemma game studies in which the proportion or
percentage of cooperative responding (termed C choices) is of
prime concern, sometimes to the exclusion of stochastic measures,
transitional probabilities, and the number or length of runs.
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Stochastic measures refer to the probability of a certain
response occurring on trial n given that a certain outcome had
occurred on trial n - 1.

A general way of describing such a

probability is p(Rl/RlCl) and is read, "the probability of an Rl
response given an RlCl outcome on the previous trial."

If p(Rl/

RlCl) = 1, the Row player is always following an RlCl outcome
with an Rl choice.
Transitional probabilities refer to the probability of a
particular outcome occurring on trial n given that a certain
outcome occurred on trial n - 1.

These answer such questions as:

Given an Rlcl outcome, what are the respective probabilities of
this outcome being followed by an RlC2, R2Cl, R2C2, or RlCl outcome?
Length of runs refers to the number of times a particular
outcome sequentially occurs.
ins".

Long runs are referred to as "lock-

Usually what is examined is the duration or number of such

runs, often RlCl or R2C2 runs.

However, one can also investigate

how such runs begin and end. Once participants have selected their choices over a given
number of trials, the protocols can be analyzed to yield the above
measures.

These measures can often be interpreted in terms of

"rich" psychological concepts.

For example, with respect to the

Prisoner's Dilemma game, the following propensities may be interpreted in descriptive psychological terms:

(a) p(Rl/RlCl) as

trustworthiness, (b) p(Rl/RlC2) as forgiveness, (c) p(Rl/R2Cl)
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as repentance, and (d) p(Rl/R2C2) as trust (Amnon Rapoport & Mowshowitz, 1966).
One caution must be expressed with regard to interpreting
these precise statistics in psychological terms: They vary in interpretation just as the term "cooperative responding" differs
between various strategically different games.
priate but dismissing these measures is not.

Caution is appro-

Regretfully, very

few of these measures are reported in studies despite the fact
that they are strongly interrelated by mathematical interdependencies to the more commonly reported response frequencies. Rapoport (Note 1) states that experimental games tend to be used
so as to "read off" only one or two of these measures under a
variety of experimental manipulations

The choice of which ones

to report usually depends upon the primary interest of the experimenter in how they relate to real life situations or existing psychological theories.

Despite the size of this body of literature,

results are often inconclusive because of (a) the small number of
participants, and (b) the omission of what the individual experimenter considers irrelevant data in terms of his or her particular
interest.
The interest of the experimenter also dictates which of the
three classes of independent variables will be manipulated in an
experiment:

(a) participant variables referring to characteristics

of the players, (b) structural variables referring to the magnitude
of payoffs or the relationship between payoffs, or (c) situational

18
variables referring to conditions present in the experiment.
Participant Variables.
has

A number of participant variables

been investigated in experimental games including family

background (Crowne, 1966), personality patterns (Bennett & Carbonari, 1976; Deutsch, 1960; Gillis & Woods, 1971; Marin, 1973;
Terhune, 1968, 1974), and sex of participants (Kahn, Hottes, &
Davis, 1971; Oskamp & Perlman, 1965; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965).
Rapoport et

al. (1976) states that the relationship between per-

sonality variables and game-playing behaviour is tenuous given the
abundance of both positive and negative findings using existing
personality tests (see Terhune, 1970, for a review).
With respect to sex differences, the results are also mixed
and appear to be affected by numerous other variables including
the particular game (Caldwell, 1976; Carment, 1974; McNeel, McClintock, & Nuttin, 1972; Miller, 1967), the sex of the opponent (Mack,
Auburn, & Knight, 1971; Rapoport & Chammah, 1965), the sex of the
experimenter (Skotko, Langmeyer, & Lundgren, 1974), the strategy of
the other (Bixenstine, Chambers, & Wilson, 1964; Komorita, 1965;
Smith, Vernon, & Tarte, 1975), and the length of the game (Rapoport
& Chammah, 1965).

The most well-substantiated finding is that males

and females do not differ initially but do differ as a function of
the interaction during iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games.

Females

tend to become progressively more competitive in these games.
usefulness of the sex variable

The

as a predictor of game-playing be-

haviour has been called into question by Ingram and Berger (1977)

in an article which demonstrated that individual difference dimensions such as sex-role orientation affect the behaviour of women
the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Structural Variables.

Structural variables can refer to

the magnitude of payoff parameters within a particular game matrix
or the ordinal relationship among the payoffs. When the ordinal
relationships among the payoffs are altered, different games are
created.
Some studies which have varied the magnitude of payoff parameters include Frenkel (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976), Guyer
and Rapoport (1972), Jones, Steele, Gahagan, and Tedeschi (1968),
Rapoport and Chammah (1965, 1966), and Steele and Tedeschi (1967).
These studies attempted to identify predictors of choice in mixedmotive games that exist within the game itself.

This prediction

of behaviour maybe aided by the establishment of utility functions
for the players.

A utility function indicates the value ascribed

by a player to the possible outcomes in the game. Wyer (1969)
attempted to determine whether behaviour in two-person games could
be more easily predicted by transforming outcomes to utilities.
A slightly greater proportion of the variance in participant's responses was accounted for by parameters defined in terms of utilities than by similar parameters defined in terms of the payoff
values shown on the game matrix.
Studies which have directly compared the behaviour of player
in different games include Miller (1967), Miller and Holmcfi (1975),
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Swingle and MacLean (1971), and Swingle and Santi (1972).
Rapoport et al., (1976) attempted to integrate available
data from studies which investigated changes in the magnitude of
payoffs.

In both single-play (players choose only once per matrix)

and iterated games, the player's choice frequencies generally reflected the direction of the corresponding changes in payoff magnitude (no tests of significance were performed).
Situational Variables.

A large number of situational

variables has been investigated within the experimental gaming
literature including note-passing versus electronic feedback
(Enzle, Hansen, & Lowe, 1975), the

preexperimental relationship

between protagonists (Wallace & Rothaus, 1969), information concerning the opponent's past behavior (Braver & Rohrer, 1975), modes
of presentation of the game (Guyer, Hamberger, & Fox, 1973; Hamberger, 1974), how closely the experimental situation resembles a
situation in real life (Young, 1977), the proximity of the players
(Gardin, Kaplan, Firestone, & Cowan, 1973), incentive magnitude
(Gallo, Funk, & Levine, 1969; Gallo & Sheposh, 1971; Knox & Douglas,
1971; Oskamp & Klienke, 1970; Shaw & Thorslund, 1975; see Shaw,
1972, for a review), effects of commitment to future interaction
(Slusher, Roering, & Rose, 1974), the ability to reward or punish
the other player for desirable or undesirable responses (Bedell &
Sistrunk, 1975a, 1975b), the perceived status of the other player
(Mack, 1976), the effects of modelling (Braver & Barnett, 1976),
the relationship between motives and reward level (Friedland, Ar-
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nold, & Thibault, 1974), and perceived similarity and friendship
(Krauss, 1966; McClintock, Nuttin, & McNeel, 1970; McNeel & Reed,
1975; Oskamp & Perlman, 1965).
The situational variable of communication has been found to
increase cooperative responding in gaming situations (Cheney,
Harford, & Solomon, 1972; Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977;
Scodel, Minas, Ratoosh, & Lipetz, 1959; Grandberg, Stevens & Katz,
1975).

However, these findings have not been invariant. It ap-

pears that communication has different effects which depend on such
variables as (a) timing of communication (Krauss & Deutsch, 1966;
Marwell, Schmitt, & Shotola, 1971; Voiseem & Sistrunk, 1971), (b)
communication medium (Chapanis, 1971; Flint, Harris, & Rector, Note
2; Vitz & Kite, 1970; Wichman, 1970), (c) communication credibility
(Benton, 1972; Gahagan & Tedeschi, 1968), and (d) communication
content (Swensson, 1967; Wyer & Polen, 1971).
Strategy of the Other in Prisoner's Dilemma Games
All studies reported in this section involved the use of
the standard Prisoner's Dilemma game in assessing the effects of
the programmed strategy of the other.
fall into one of three categories:

A programmed strategy may

(a) pure noncontingent strate-

gies, (b) randomized noncontingent strategies, or (c) contingent
strategies.

A randomized noncontingent strategy is one in which

the programme delivers a particular percentage of cooperative responses (C responses) over a number of randomly selected trials.
A pure noncontingent strategy delivers either 100% or 0% C respon-
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ses over the course of the game. A contingent strategy is a strategy which depends upon the responses of the real player in determining the responses of the programmed opponent.
Oskamp (1971) reported six studies in which the 100% C
strategy was compared to the 0% C strategy.

All studies in-

dicated that 100% C produced substantially more concurrent cooperative responding than 0% C.

Differences were significant for Sermat

(1967) and Wilson (1969), very large but significance was not reported for Lave (1965) and Harford and Solomon (1967) , and moderate
in size but significance not reported for Scodel (1962) and Solomon
(1960) who used sequential play.

Studies which have compared

extreme levels of randomized cooperation have found significant
concurrent differences in the same direction as the 100% C and
0% C comparison (e.g., Heller, 1967; Knapp & Podell, 1968; Lynch,
1968; Shure & Meeker, 1968) with the exception of a study by
Bixenstine, Potash, and Wilson (1963) who, by allowing their
participants 10 free play warm-up trials may have obscured any
strategy effects.

In the study by Knapp and Podell (1968) part-

icipants were given 24 trials of 50% C before changing to a very
high or low level of programmed cooperative responding and, as
mentioned, they found a significant strategy effect, possibly
because the change in the percentage of cooperation was noticeable to participants.
to 20% C:

One study (Lave, 1965) compared 100% C

The 100% C strategy produced significantly more

cooperative responding.
The studies presented above indicate that when two strate-
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gies with highly discrepant percentages of cooperative responding
are compared, the highly cooperative strategy produced more cooperative responding on the part of the participants than the highly uncooperative strategy.
A tit-for-tat strategy is a contingent matching strategy
which matches on trial n, the participant's response on trial 11 1.

A number of studies has compared the behaviour of participants

in a tit-far-tat strategy condition to those in one of various noncontingent strategy conditions.

The exception to the rule is a

study by Wilson (1971) in which the tit-for-tat strategy was compared to variations on a tit-for-tat theme.

The tit-for-tat

strategy produced the highest level of cooperative responding.
Studies in which the conditional tit-for-tat strategy was compared
to noncontingent strategies are presented here to demonstrate that,
in Prisoner's Dilemma games, the tit-for-tat strategy evoked more
cooperative responding than noncontingent strategies, even when
the noncontingent strategy involved a comparable number of cooperative choices.
In sequential play situations in which the real player must
choose first on each trial, the tit-for-tat strategy has been
found to produce significantly greater cooperative responding than
either 100% C or 90% C strategies and also 0% C or 10% C strategies
(Solomon, 1960; Oskamp, 1974; Whitworth & Lucker, 1969).

In sim-

ultaneous play situations, the tit-for-tat strategy has produced
significantly more cooperative responding than 0%, C (Crumbaugh &
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Evans, 1967; Wilson, 1969) but was not significantly different
(although in the expected direction) in effects from a 100% C strategy (Oskamp & Perlman, 1965; Wilson, 1969).

However, the tit-

for-tat strategy produced more cooperative responding than a 100%
C strategy for participants characterized by own gain maximization (accumulating as many points for oneself as possible) versus
relative gain maximization (accumulating points in excess of
those of the opponent) as their central goal (Kuhlman & Marshello,
1975b; Oskamp, 1971).
These studies do not permit a statement that a conditional
strategy is likely to produce more cooperative responding than a
noncontingent strategy because the overall frequency of cooperative responding differs among the various strategies.
The problem can be overcome by the use of a yoked control
design in which one group of participants plays against a tit-fortat strategy.

The "yoked" group receives a cooperative or non-co-

operative response when the tit-for-tat programmed strategy delivers such a response to the first group.

Hence, in the first

group, the programme's responses are contingent upon the behavior
of the real player while in the yoked control group, these choices
are not contingent.
A number of studies has demonstrated that the contingent
tit-for-tat strategy produced significantly more cooperative responding than a noncontingent strategy having the same level of
programmed cooperative responding (Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967;
Downing et al., 1975; Downing & Ritter, Note 3). Other studies
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also confirm the tendency of a tit-for-tat strategy to facilitate
the development of cooperative responding when other variables
interact at particular levels (Kahn et al., 1971; McNeel, 1973).
For example, McNeel (1973) did find a contingency effect in the
proportion of his sample characterized by own gain versus relative
gain maximization as their central goal.
The results of the above studies demonstrate conclusively
that the level of cooperative responding produced by participants
is influenced by whether or not the programme is contingent.

It

is possible that a sense of control over the programmed other's
responses is instrumental in the production of higher levels of
cooperative responding on the part of participants.

It may also

be possible that the participants are attempting to maximize their
gains:

The cooperative response has been shown to be the rational

choice against a tit-for-tat strategy (Downing, 1975; Downing et
al., 1975).
In the present study, a major factor of interest was the
stability of the respective effects of three strategies when preceded by a particular strategy during the first half of the game.
Delayed strategy studies are the prime source of data which indicate
that previous experience against a particular level of cooperative
responding on the part of the simulated other influences behaviour.
However, studies of concurrent strategy effects also provide relevant information as to these effects.
In terms of concurrent effects of strategies with changing
cooperation levels either over the course of a game (Amnon

Rapoport
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& Mowshowitz, 1966) or after a number of trials (Bixenstine &
Wilson, 1963; Swingle, 1968; Swingle & Gillis, 1968) it has been
found that a change in programmed cooperation from a low to a high
level produced more cooperative responding than the reverse sequence or no change in programmed cooperation.

In delayed stra-

tegy studies such effects' have also been noted for 0% C changing
to 100% C versus a solely 100% C strategy (Scodel, 1962) and for
a solely 4% C strategy versus strategies which change from 4% C to
higher levels (Swingle & Coady, 1967).
In a study by Smith et al. (1975), male and female participants played a 60 trial Prisoner's Dilemma game consisting of 10
pretreatment trials against either an 80% C or 20% C programmed
other, followed by 50 trials of within-trial tit-for-tat (the
programme matches the participant's response on the same trial.)
On the final 50 trials, both male and female participants were
more cooperative after having played against the 80% C versus 20%
C pretreatment.

The data also indicated that when the initial few

trials were programmed cooperatively, cooperative responding by the
participants increased at a significantly greater rate than when
the initial few trials were predominantly competitively programmed.
This study is not directly comparable to the results of the above
studies because the 80% C pretreatment followed by a within-trial
tit-for-tat is not equivalent to a high - low sequence of programmed
cooperation.
Harford and Hill (1967) and Harford and Solomon (1967) have
found that a "reformed sinner" stategy (0% C, then tit-for-tat)
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produced significantly more delayed cooperative responding in
Prisoner's Dilemma games than a "lapsed saint" strategy (100% C,
then tit-for-tat) for up to 20 trials but the effect has been shown
to dissipate when the tit-for-tat strategy is continued for 60
trials or more (Oskamp, 1970; Sermat, 1967).

This lack of differ-

ences after pretreatment between the final tit-for-tat strategies
suggests that the concurrent effects of such a strategy override
the delayed effects of previous strategies, particularly when the
final period of programmed tit-for-tat responding is prolonged.
In addition, no significant differences have been reported between
solely tit-for-tat strategies and reformed sinner strategies
(Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967; Harford & Hill, 1967; Sermat, 1967).
Threat in Two-Person Conflict Situations
Social conflicts often involve the exchange of explicit or
tacit threats.

An explicit threat is one which is specific with

regard to the course of action the recipient or target must take
to avoid punishment and to the magnitude of the punishment exacted
for noncompliance. This type of threat may be operationally defined as an if-then statement (Kelley, 1965) usually communicated
in the form of a message.

A typical threat message in research

using the Prisoner's Dilemma game reads, "If you do not make Choice
1 on the next trial, I will take 10 points from your total." Behavioural compliance consists of the recipient making the designated choice on post-message trials as required by the source of the
threat.

28
The effectiveness of explicit threats in producing compliance
has been shown to be a function of the cost of threat enforcement
(Mogy & Pruitt, 1974), the status of the threatener (Faley &
Tedeschi, 1971), threat credibility (Horai & Tedschi, 1969; Nacci
and Tedeschi, 1973), the distribution of the power to punish (Berkowitz, Hylander, & Bakaitis, 1973; Michener & Cohen, 1973), the
magnitude of the threatened punishment (Bonoma & Tedeschi, 1973j
Tedeschi, Bonoma, & Brown, 1971), the choice behaviour of the source
(Bonoma & Tedeschi, 1973; Horai & Tedeschi, 1975), the wording of
the threat message (Schlenker, Bonoma, Tedeschi, & Pivnick, 1970),
and knowledge of the threatener's prior experience with another
player (Michelini, 1975).
The behaviour of the threatener has been shown to be affected
by target compliance (Monteverde, Paschke, & Tedeschi,1974;
Tedeschi, Bonoma,& Lindskold, 1970), whether the target can also
threaten and retaliate (Tedeschi, Bonoma,& Novinson, 1970), the
cost of the use of threat (Tedeschi, Horai, Lindskold, & Faley,
1970), the magnitude of retaliation (Lindskold, Bennet, & Wayner,
1976) and whether the threatener is a group or an individual
(Lindskold, McElwain & Wayner, 1977).
Tacit threats are communicated by the actual sequence of
choices in a gaming situation.

Hence an individual involved in

a game may, through his choice behaviour, punish the other in an
attempt to reach his desired goal.

The Deutsch and Krauss (1960,

1962) Trucking game is an example of a social conflict situation
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in which threat is of a tacit nature.

Each player is told that

he or she is the operator of a trucking company with the goal of
delivering goods to a destination.

Operating costs are assessed

on the basis of time taken to deliver these goods.

Conflict be-

tween, players is generated from the layout of available delivery
routes, the shortest and most lucrative route being a one-lane
road which only one truck may use at a time.

Threats may be intro-

duced into the paradigm by providing gates to the players.

These

gates may be lowered to prevent the other from using the shorter
one-lane road to reach his destination.

Borah (1963) and Kelley

(1965) have stated that this operational definition of the concept
of threat is unsatisfactory:

The gates may be used to punish the

opponent, to trick him, to administer revenge, or to signal whose
turn it is to use the fastest route.
Like the effectiveness of explicit threat, the effectiveness of tacit threat also depends upon a number of variables including the threatener's satisfaction with payoffs (Frenkel, cited
in Rapoport et al., 1976; Guyer & Rapoport, 1972), the magnitude
of the penalty the threatener can inflict (Guyer & Rapoport, 1972),
and the cost of threat usage (Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et
al., 1976).

These studies will be reported in more detail in the

section dealing with empirical studies of threat-vulnerable games.
Theorists differ in their estimation of the effects of threat
availability on behaviour in strategic interactions.

Deterrent

and anti-deterrent (escalation of conflict views) of threat have

30
been subjected to experimental investigation.

Deutsch and Krauss

(1960, 1962) suggest that threat availability decreases the level
of cooperation as measured by the magnitude of players' joint
payoffs (welfare outcome).

Hornstein (1965) showed that the use

of unambiguous contingent threats in a real-estate game reduced
the likelihood of agreement.

Other studies indicate no such

relationship (Black & Higbee, 1973; Meeker, Shure, & More, 1964;
Shomer, Davis, & Kelley, 1966; Tedeschi, 1970).

Whether the

availability of explicit threat does or does not exacerbate conflict is a moot question due to findings which have indicated that
an interaction exists between threat availability and communication
availability.

Both Smith and Anderson (1975) in a Deutsch and

Krauss type game and Nardin (1968) in an expanded Prisoner's
Dilemma game have demonstrated that tacit threat is detrimental
to cooperation when communication is permitted but not when communication is prohibited.

Santi and Wells (1975) investigated the

effects of communication opportunity (forced, optional, or no
communication) on behaviour in a 2 X 2 game in which tacit threats
were transmitted via choices.

Results indicated that the commun-

ication variable did not significantly affect game-playing behaviour.
The present study is concerned with a situation in which
threat is always available to the programmed opponent. When this
is the case, it is possible to assess the effects of the use or
non-use of this form of power.
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Studies of Non-Use of Power
A general term to describe the opponent's strategy in all of
the studies to be presented in this section is "passivity." The
range of studies in which passivity has been examined is broad, as
are the operational definitions of the term.
field and gaming experiments.

Studies include both

Most studies indicate that pacifist

behaviour should not be recommended as a means for avoiding conflict
and increasing cooperation (see Ofshe, 1971, for a theoretical review) .
A large body of literature concerned with pacifism has used
gaming situations rather than 2 X 2 games as the primary experimental tool.

For example, Shure, Meeker and Hansford (1965) had

participants play against a totally passive simulated opponent in
an experimental situation in which either player could achieve an
initial advantage and proceed to continually dominate the situation.
The player who did so could receive a large payoff indefinitely
if he chose not to reciprocate the pacifist's initially cooperative
behaviour.

Both could shock the other for undesirable responses.

The pacifist, however, never used the shock mechanism but did
block the participant's goal responses and forced him to use violent means to acquire the payoff.

In one condition, the pacifist's

nonviolent intentions and anti-violence background (Quaker) were
communicated to participants.

In another, the pacifist actually

disarmed himself by the non-use of actions which could acquire for
him the opportunity to both dominate and shock the participants.
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This guaranteed that no reprisal would occur.
of the pacifist strategy was not impressive.

The effectiveness
The percentage of

participants who initially indicated a willingness to cooperate
was 48%. By the end of the experiment, the percentage of participants actually cooperating (taking turns in the use of a limited
message transmitter) was 39%.

The total number of participants

who cooperated was not affected by a clarification of the pacifist's
intentions of disarmament.

It can be concluded that a simulated

pure pacifist strategy in such a game does not induce high levels
of cooperation on the part of participants.

Using similar ex-

perimental situations, other studies have extended the work of Shure
et al. (1965) to include differences between a shocking and a
warning pacifist (Vincent & Tindell, 1969), balanced and unbalanced
conditions in terms of shock ratio (Tindell & Vincent, 1970), and
availability of shock purchasing power (Vincent & Schwerin, 1971).
In such an experimental situation used in the above experiments, pacifist strategies have not been effective in the induction
of cooperation for a number of reasons including the lack of an
influence channel between the pacifist and an audience which can
control the other participants (Ofshe, 1971), the use of confederate
teammates who exerted group pressure on the participants to exploit the pacifist (Meeker & Shure, 1969), and the features of the
game itself (the participants took considerable risk in allowing
the pacifist to dominate).
Studies which do suggest that a pacifist strategy may be
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effective include Tedeschi, Bonoma, and Novinson (1970), Dorris
(1972), Marwell, Schmitt, and Boyeson (1973), and Lindskold et al.
(1976).
Tedeschi et al. (1970) found that participants used a
penalty option more frequently in conditions where a simulated opponent could retaliate than in conditions in which he could not.
Lindskold et al. (1976) found no significant differences between
the behaviour of participants playing against a nonretaliatory opponent and those playing against opponents who retaliated at higher
levels (in terms of points to be taken from the participant's
total).

In other words, the pacifist strategy was no more or no

less effective than the other strategies.
A field study by Dorris (1972) is relevant to passivity in
that pacifists often make moral appeals when in conflict with a
potential aggressor.

The participants were unwitting coin dealers

who were approached by confederates posing as coin

sellers who

made (a) a moral or neutral appeal; and (b) had either been
•exploited by or had been fairly treated by a previous dealer.
Those dealers who had received the moral appeal made higher final
price offers regardless of the information communicated by the
seller concerning his treatment by a previous dealer.
Marwell et al. (1975) found that previous experience against
an unconditionally cooperative opponent (an opponent who both chose
to participate in a cooperative vs. an individual task and never
took points from the participants's total) resulted in the eventual
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cooperation and non-exploitation by 12 out of 13 participants.

To

choose to participate in the cooperative task was more lucrative,
hence the discrepancy between this and the study by Shure et al.
(1965).

Results were explained in terms of the effect of communi-

cation of pacifist intent via the opponent's choices to work cooperatively and not to take points from the participant.
The lesults of the above studies cannot be meaningfully compared because of the lack of standardization between the various
situations used and the concomitant diversity in the operational
definition of the concept of passivity.
Swingle (1970) conducted a study in which it was possible
to examine one variable under which the non-use of available power
may differentially invite exploitation.

He used three matrices

which varied the power position of the participant relative to the
opponent:

participant in power, equal power and opponent in power.

The opponent responded on the basis of an unconditionally cooperative strategy, allowing the player to obtain his highest payoff
on any single trial.

Participants made significantly more exploi-

tative responses when playing against an unconditionally cooperative powerful opponent than when playing against either an unconditionally cooperative equal or less powerful opponent.

These

results were also supported by Black and Higbee (1973) in conditions
where no threat-message was available to the male participants.
Exploitative responses occurred with a significantly greater frequency in the opponent-in-power condition than in the participant-
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in-power condition.

The explanation for such behaviour revolves

around perceptions of the unconditionally cooperative opponent.
These include the attribution of stupidity to the opponent (Swingle,
1974), the motivation to exploit a seemingly weak opponent (Lave,
1965), and the belief that the opponent will hesitate to use a
high level of power out of fear or guilt about the effects of the
use of such power (Swingle, 1970).
Threat-Vulnerable Games:

Theoretical Considerations

Rapoport and Guyer (1966) have presented a taxonomy of twoperson two-choice games in which each player has a strong preference-ordering of outcomes.

Three members of the class of games

having a single threat-vulnerable equilibrium appear in Figure 4.
An equilibrium outcome is one from which neither player can unilaterally depart without diminishing his own payoff. With reference to Game 21 it can be seen that both players have a dominating
strategy, for regardless of the other's choice, both obtain a larger
payoff by playing their first choices (Rl or Cl).

However, if

Column were to depart from Cl to C2 while Row remained static, his
or her payoff would be diminished by 1 unit.

Should Row unilater-

ally depart from Rl to R2 while Column remained static, Row would
also suffer a loss.

Equilibrium outcomes in which a player may

induce but not force the other to shift are called threat-vulnerable
equilibria.

An inducement to shift is said to be present when it

is to the Column player's advantage to shift rather than to suffer
the consequences of the Row player's shifting.

If, however, after
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Row shifts it is to Column's advantage to shift, he is said to
have been forced to shift.
In Game 21, if both players select their dominating strategies, the Column player obtains his most preferred outcome (4)
but the Row player obtains his next-to-least preferred outcome (2).
The only way in which Row can obtain his most preferred outcome is
for him to induce Column to choose non-dominantly, (i.e., choose
C2).

Up to this point in our discussion there is no reason why

Column would respond non-dominantly.

But, should Row unilaterally

do so, Column would receive his next-to-least preferred outcome
(2).

Therefore, Row may obtain his most preferred outcome if Column

perceives or is persuaded that it is to his advantage to shift
rather than to suffer the consequences of the Row player shifting.
It should be pointed out that a unilateral departure by
Row reduces not only Column's payoff but also his own.

For this

reason a departure by Row may be regarded as the use of threat
against Column which has a certain cost of execution.

It should

also be noted that once an R2Cl outcome occurs it is not in Column's
best interest to shift to C2 so as to give Row the opportunity to
shift to Rl and obtain his most desirable payoff in Rlc2.

From

Column's point of view it is more advantageous for him to appease
Row by shifting occasionally to C2 from the RlCl outcome rather than
to suffer through the costly outcomes of R2C1 and R2C2.

Therefore

it can be proposed that Row's threat would be effective only if it
is not carried out.
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As in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, there is a number of
dependent variables which can be examined including the probability
of non-dominant responding (R2 or C2 choices), and stochastic measures for which descriptive labels have been assigned (Guyer &
Rapoport, 1970).

The stochastic measures in Game 21 are:

Column:
p(C2/RlCl)

Appeasement or Column's propensity to select his
non-dominant response on trial n given that both
players had selected their dominant response on
trial n - 1.

The motivation behind such a shift may

be to forestall the use of threat by Row or to satisfy
some standard of fair play.
p(C2/R2Cl)

Capitulation or Column's propensity to select his
non-dominant response on trial n given that he had
selected his dominant response previously and Row
had selected his non-dominant response on trial
n - 1.

p(C2/RlC2)

Generosity.

When Column repeats a C2 choice after

the RlC2 outcome he is giving Row his largest payoff
once again.
p(Cl/R2C2)

Doublecross.

In shifting to Cl after an R2C2 out-

come Column prevents Row from obtaining the spoils
of his revolt.
Row:
p(R2/RlCl)

Revolt o r Row's p r o p e n s i t y to choose non-dominantly
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given that he and the Column player had chosen their
dominant responses on trial n - 1.
p(R2/R2Cl)

Persistence refers to Row's propensity to respond
non-dominantly given that he had previously chosen
in this way while the Column player had selected
his dominant response on trial n - 1.

p(R2/RlC2)

Dissatisfaction.

Following an RlC2 outcome, Column

has the opportunity to re-establish the natural outcome by shifting to Cl, provided Row repeats Rl.
Therefore, p(R2/RlC2) is the probability that Row
will not allow the natural outcome to be established,
hence it is a measure of his dissatisfaction even
after having received the largest payoff.
p(R2/R2C2)

Distrust.

Following an R2C2 outcome, Row has the

opportunity to obtain his largest payoff by shifting
to Rl if Column plays C2 again on the next trial.
For Column to switch to Cl on the next trial would
re-establish the natural outcome given Row plays
Rl.

Row manifests his distrust by playing R2 again

so that if Column does shift the outcome R2C1 will
result:

Column receives the decrement in payoff

immediately rather than on the next trial.
Very often only four of the above measures are reported
(appeasement, capitulation, revolt and persistence) because of the
low frequency of occurrence of Rlc2 and R2C2 outcomes necessary to
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calculate reliable generosity, doublecross, dissatisfaction and
distrust measures(e.g., Rapoport et al., 1976, p. 194; Santi &
Wells, 1975).
Threat-Vulnerable Games:

Empirical Studies

Participant Variables.

Edwards and Gordon (cited in Rapo-

port et al. , 1976) examined the performance of female and mixed
pairs in Game 19.

Rapoport et al. (1976) used male pairs. When

the performances of male and female players were compared, the
largest differences involved the sex of the Column player. When
Column was a woman, both male and female Row players resorted to
the R2 choice more frequently.

Male Column players demonstrated a

higher frequency of C2 responses than female Column players against
either a male or female Row player.
Rapoport et al. (1971) compared the performance of Danish
and American players in Game 19. American and Danish students
played 100 times as Row and 100 times as Column on each of three
different matrices which varied the discrepancy between Row's and
Column's payoffs at the natural outcome.

No systematic differences

were found in outcome distributions for the three different matrices.
This finding was explained in terms of a contagion effect: Participants developed a fixed manner of playing, thereby showing little
sensitivity to variations in game structure.

This contagion effect

has also been found in the Prisoner's Dilemma game (Rapoport &
Chammah, 1965).

An analysis of conditional propensities generally

supported the conjecture that Danes are more submissive than Ameri-
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cans in the Underdog role of the game (i.e., as Row): The propensity of American Row players to play R2 following each of the four
outcomes was larger than that of Danes.
cans and Danes did not differ

As Column players, Ameri-

with respect to the willingness to

yield to threat and differed only slightly on the appeasement propensity:

Americans appeased slightly more frequently than Danes.

It is probable that the behaviour of both Danes and Americans in
either role of the game was dependent upon the behaviour of the
other player.

However, these effects were not ascertained because

any one player alternated between playing as Row or as Column.
Therefore any one player may have adopted a fixed manner of playing
in either or both roles.
In a second experiment, each participant played against
three Column strategies and against three Row strategies.
strategies were fixed (i.e., were not probablistic).

The six

Participants

were therefore able to discern and adjust their counterstrategies
accordingly.

Such strategies are more likely to make participants

aware that their opponent is programmed to respond in a patterned
manner.

For example, Row's strategies were as follows:
(a) "Passive" strategy:

100% Rl

(b) "Modest" strategy:

The programme used R2 only after
three consecutive Cl choices by the
participant.

The programme then

remained with R2 until the participant shifted to C2 at which time
it shifted to Rl.
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(c) "Demanding" strategy:

The programme used Rl only
after a C2 choice, and always
used R2 after a Cl choice on
the part of the participant.

When fixed strategies are used, differences can be explained
in terms of differences in discerning the optimal counterstrategies.
American students tended to play closer to the prescribed optimal
strategies than the Danish students.
Sequences in the initial experiment in which bona fide
players chose Rl or Cl consistently for 100 trials were examined
to determine their effects, under the assumption that, because
such extreme strategies occurred only occasionally, participants
were not likely to falsely assume that they were playing a programmed
opponent.

Results supported those of the initial experiment: Danes

tended to play submissively in the Underdog role of the game and
also tended to exploit a passive Underdog more than Americans did.
These differences were not noted in the second experiment which
suggests that when participants are relatively sure that the opponent is indeed another person, differences in behaviour are manifested.

Participants were not matched on other variables, such

as grade point average, hence there is considerable difficulty in
ascribing the observed differences to nationality alone.
Structural Variables.

Of the three threat-vulnerable games,

only Games 19 and 21 have been used as research tools. Four studies
will be presented in this section.

These studies have relied pre-
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dominantly on descriptive presentation of very large amounts of
data and have not included statistical tests of significance.
Rapoport et al. (1976) compared outcome frequencies and
stochastic measures between the two games.

These games differ

only in the position of Row's next-to-most and next-to-least
preferred payoffs. With respect to outcome frequencies, the two
games were very similar.

In 9 out of 10 pairs, "Row had to work

for his share at about the same rate, that is, to resort to R2
about 15 to 30 percent of the time" (p. 191).
Interpretation of the stochastic measures is identical for
the two games.

In both games, the following rank ordering of

Row's propensity of playing R2 obtained:
p(R2/RlC2)>p(R2/RlCl).

p(R2/R2C2)> p(R2/R2Cl)>

However the difference between the two

game matrices did modify the mean values of p(R2/R2C2) and p(R2/RlCl)
appropriately:

"Revolts" were tower in Game 19 (.11) than in Game

21 (.15) because an Rl choice in Game 19 may result in a higher
payoff than in Game 21.

The propensity

p(R2/R2c2) was higher

in Game 21 (.56) than in Game 19 (.41) because an R2 choice in
Game 21 may result in a higher payoff than in Game 19.

The rank

ordering of Column's propensities differed between the two games.
In Game 19, the following rank ordering obtained:
p(C2/RlC2)> p(C2/RlCl)> p(C2/R2Cl).

p(C2/R2C2)>

In game 21, the first and

second propensities were reversed in order, as were the third and
fourth.

Since Column's payoff are identical in both magnitude

and position in both these games, the reversal could not be
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satisfactorily explained.

The authors suggested that the reversal

may be a consequence of an indirect effect, i.e., the difference
in Row's payoff structure between the two games. The difference
in the mean values of p(C2/R2C2) was considered to be relatively
meaningless in view of the fact that the outcome R2C2 occurred
very infrequently in both Game 19 and Game 21 (a mean frequency of
3 and 4 trials, respectively, in a 100 trial game).

This study

indicated that the results of experiments using Game 19 or Game 21
are comparable and that the frequency with which a choice is repeated is related to the rank of the associated payoff.
The effects of payoff magnitudes have been examined in
Game 21. Making one choice per presented matrix theoretically
reflects the decision of a rational player because he or she is
not susceptible to patterns of reward or punishment which are
inherent in iterated games.

To vary the particular game and the

relative magnitude of payoffs within each game would supposedly
aid in identifying the relative weight with which game theoretical
factors contribute to the strategy choices observed in iterated
games.
Guyer and Rapoport (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976) varied
three

dimensions in Game 21:

(a) Row's dissatisfaction with the

natural outcome, (b) Row's threat to Column, and (c) Row's cost of
threat usage.

Row's dissatisfaction was varied by increasing the

discrepancy between his and Column's payoff in the RlCl outcome
quadrant.

Row's threat to Column was varied by increasing the

discrepancy between Column's payoff in the RlCl outcome and Column's
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payoff should Row choose R2 while Column remained static. Major
findings included:

(a) the more "satisfied" Row was, the greater

the percentage of Rl and Cl responses by the Row and Column players
respectively; (b) the lower the magnitude of Row's threat to
Column, the greater the percentage of Cl choices by Column; and
(c) when the cost of threat usage to Row was high, the percentage
of R2 responses by Row decreased.

These observations generally

indicated that choice behaviour varies as a function of payoff
magnitudes usually in the expected direction.
Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al. , 1976) examined
the performance of 18 pairs of participants in 100 trial games,
including Game 19.

As in the single play experiment, payoff changes

in iterated games do modify choice frequencies.

Stochastic measures

were also shown to vary as a function of changes in payoff magnitudes.

The direction, magnitude and explanation of such changes

in game-playing behaviour as measured by either choice frequencies
or conditional probabilities has yet to be drawn into a cohesive
body of literature, most likely because of the difficulty in assimilating contradictory findings into an empirically derived model
of behaviour.
Situational Variables.

Guyer and Rapoport (1970) investiga-

ted the performance of 10 pairs of male undergraduates in Game 21.
The matrix used in presented as Variant 2 in Figure 5.

This study

is presented here in order to facilitate a comparison with the
subsequent Santi and Wells (1975) study in which the two indepen-

Column
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Row
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R1
8\ 2 0 \
\-1 \ - 2
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-2\ 15 \
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Figure 5. Variants of Game 21 (Santi & Wells)
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dent variables were situational and structural in nature.
game was played for 300 trials.
portance:

The

Two questions were of prime im-

(a) Does Row use his threat option against Column (R2)

in attempting to gain his (Row's) most preferred payoff in the
outcome RlC2, and (b) is this use of threat by Row successful in
obtaining concessions from Column (a C2 choice)?

The mean percen-

tage of each of the four possible outcomes indicated that Row
does carry out his threat and that Column does depart from the Cl
choice:

The mean combined percentages of the outcomes R2C1 and

R2C2 and the outcomes RlC2 and R2C2 were 13% and 28% respectively.
A high correlation between the frequency of RlC2 and R2Cl outcomes,
r = +.83, p < . 05, suggested that the use of the R2 choice by Row
may be successful in gaining concessions from Column. However,
RlC2 outcomes occurred more than twice as frequently as R2Cl outcomes (24% vs. 9% respectively) suggesting that appeasement also
played a role in Column's conoession-making behaviour because
Column is making C2 responses in excess of those "demanded" by the
use of R2 by Row.
Conditional probabilities also provided data relevant to the
two primary questions.

The conditional propensity, p(R2/RlCl),

or the likelihood that Row will carry out a threat against Column,
was .10. The likelihood that Column would appease Row, p(C2/RlCl),
was .12. The likelihood that Column would capitulate to Row's
threat, p(C2/R2Cl), was .23.

Evidently, Row does occasionally use

threat and Column does make concessions in the form of appeasement
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or capitulation.

The correlations between Row's likelihood of

using threat, p(R2/RlCl), and Column's likelihood of appeasement,
p(C2/RlCl), indicated that the more likely Row was to use threat,
the more likely Column was to appease, £ = +.69, j><.05. Also,
the more likely Row was to use threat, the more likely Column was
to capitulate, p(C2/R2Cl), r = +.96, p <.01.
Santi and Wells (1975) have also supplied data relevant to
the effect of Row's behaviour on Column.

One hundred and eighty

male participants played 125 trials of Game 21 on one of three
matrices which varied Row's threat to Column by increasing the discrepancy between Column's payoff at the RlCl outcome and his payoff should Row choose R2 while Column remained static.
variants are presented in Figure 5.

The three

Row's threat to Column is

highest in Variant 1 and lowest in Variant 3.

Three communication

conditions (forced, optional and no communication) constituted a
second independent variable.

This variable did not significantly

affect gaming behavior.
However, significant variant effects were found.

Row's

probability of playing an R2 response decreased significantly,
p<.001, from Variant 1 (approximately .60) to Variant 2 (approximately .42) to Variant 3 (approximately .27).

Row's propensity

to revolt, p(R2/RlCl), and to persist, p(R2/R2Cl), and Column's
propensity to appease, p(C2/RlCl), also decreased significantly,
P_'sC.05 as Row's threat to Column decreased.

With respect to the

appeasement propensity, Variants 1 and 2 differed from 3, p<.05,
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but not from each other: Appeasement was greater in variants with
high or moderate threat than in a variant with low threat. Thus,
predictably, when there was substantial cost to Column when Row
carries out a threat, Column was more likely to choose his nondominant response after and RlCl outcome more frequently as the use
of threat by Row increased.

It would appear at first glance that

Column was indeed susceptible to changes in the magnitude of Row's
threat (noted by Guyer & Rapoport, 1972).

An alternative explana-

tion may be that Column's behaviour was in part a function of the
Row player's responses to the changes in payoff magnitude.
This interdependence of behaviour is further highlighted by
a comparison of the Guyer and Rapoport (1970) and Santi and Wells
(1975) studies. Any meaningful comparison must be performed on
the differences in behaviour on Variant 2 (no communication condition) of the Santi and Wells experiment.
to the matrix used by

Variant 2 is identical

Guyer and Rapoport, therefore permitting a

comparison of the performance of players across the two studies.
In the Guyer and Rapoport study, Row selected Rl on 86% of the
trials whereas in the Santi and Wells study, Row did so on 47% of
the trials.

In view of these differences, it might be' expected that

Column's behaviour would be substantially different.

However, in

both studies, Column chose his dominant strategy (Cl) on 70% of
the trials and capitulated, p(C2/R2Cl), with a propensity of .23.
The largest difference in behaviour occurred with respect to the
appeasement propensity, p(C2/RlCl).

In the Santi and Wells

(1975) study, the propensities for revolt and appeasement were
.42 and .41 respectively.

In the Guyer and Rapoport (1970)
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study, these propensities were .10 and .12. It appears that the index of behaviour most affected by changes in Row's behaviour is the
appeasement propensity.

Is Column appeasing more frequently because

Row's behaviour differs between the two studies or do other variables account for the difference?

Neither study singularly or in

comparison with the other yields a definitive conclusion concerning the effect of one player's behaviour upon the other.

To draw

such a conclusion requires that the behaviour of one player be
placed under experimental control such that evidence for causality,
if any, can be gathered.
Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976) reported
such an experiment, using Game 19, in which the behaviour of participants was investigated as a function of three Row strategies and
three Column strategies.

Eighteen pairs of participants played a

100 trial game in each of the following conditions:
(a) as Row against Column's
1.

"Adamant" strategy:

2. "Tight" strategy:

100% Cl

p(Cl/a single Rl) = .75
p(Cl/a single R2) = 1.00

In this strategy Column indicates a willingness
to share voluntarily but refuses to shift to C2
after Row uses R2.
3. "Semi-yielding" strategy:

p(Cl/a single Rl) = 1.00
p(Cl/a single R2) =

.50

p(C2 a single R2) =

.50

Column refuses to share voluntarily but will shift
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to C2 after Row uses R2 with a probability of .50.
(b)

as Column against Row's
1.

"Passive" strategy:

2.

"Modest" strategy:

100% Rl

p(Rl/a single Cl) = 1.00
p(Rl/two consecutive Cl's) = .75
p(R2/two consecutive Cl's) = .25
p(Rl/three consecutive Cl's) = .50
p(R2/three consecutive Cl's) = .50
p(R2/four or more Cl's) = 1.00
p(Rl/C2) = 1.00
This strategy reflects a gradual increase in Row's
propensity to select R2 as the number of Cl choices
increases.
3.

"Demanding" strategy

p(Rl/a s i n g l e Cl or C2) = 1.00
p(Rl/two consecutive Cl's) = .50
p(R2/two consecutive C l ' s ) = .50
p(R2/three or more consecutive Cl's) = 1.00
Row manifests a more rapid increase in
the s e l e c t i o n of R2.
Five matrices, presented in Figure 6, were used to assess
the effects of changes in Row's s a t i s f a c t i o n with the RlCl outcome
and Row's cost of t h r e a t usage.

Row's s a t i s f a c t i o n was manipulated

by increasing the discrepancy between Row's and Column's payoff at
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the RlCl outcome (Varants 1, 2 and 3).

Cost of threat usage was

manipulated by altering Row's payoff at the R2Cl outcome (Variants 4 and 5).

None of the following results was subjected to

tests of significance.
The effects of Column's strategies on the probability of nondominant reponding were slight.

The mean probabilities of R2 res-

ponding taken across all variants were .21, .20, and .24 for each
of the adamant, tight and semi-yielding strategies respectively.
The tight strategy evoked less persistence, p(R2/R2Cl), than the
adamant strategy in Variants 1, 2 and 3.

Therefore, Guyer and

Gordon surmise that the reduced probability of R2 responses against
the tight strategy is attributable to the reduced probability of
persistence rather than to a reduced unconditional frequency
of R2. The probability that Row would revolt, p(R2/R2Cl) was
larger in Variants 1, 2 and 3, against the tight strategy than
against the adamant strategy (.12 vs. .06 respectively), despite
the fact that an R2 choice is completely ineffective against both
these strategies.

Guyer and Rapoport suggest that Row may believe

that Column's occasional sharing in the tight strategy condition
is a result of his (Row's) own occasional resort to threat.

The

structural manipulation affected the probability of R2 responding
consistently:

Regardless of the programmed strategy, the probability

of R2 responding increased as Row became more dissatisfied and
decreased as the cost of threat usage became excessive.
The effects of Row's strategies on Column form a less con-
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voluted picture.

The probability of C2 responding was lower against

Row's passive strategy than against Row's modest and demanding strategies (.16, .28 and .29 respectively).

The results are most clear

with respect to Column's tendency to appease the Row player,
p(C2/RlCl).

Across all variants, Row's modest and demanding stra-

tegies evoked a higher mean probability of such responses than the
passive strategy (.45, .46 and .21 respectively).

There was little

difference in the mean probability of C2 responding after the R2Cl
outcome (capitulation) between Row's modest and demanding strategies.

Evidently, Column's behaviour does differ as a function

of Row's strategies, especially with regard to voluntary sharing
behaviour.
These results are similar to those of Gruder and Duslak
(1973) in which the severity of retaliation was manipulated structurally.

The study was designed to eliminate those procedural fea-

tures of previous studies of the effectiveness of pacifist strategies (e.g., Shure et al., 1965) which may have encouraged participants to be extremely competitive.

The threat-vulnerable game

used in the experiment is displayed in Figure 7.
played against one of three programmed strategies:

Participants
(a) nonretalia-

tory, (b) low retialiatory, and (c) high retaliatory.

A nonretalia-

tory opponent chose Row 1 on every trial thereby leaving himself
open to exploitation by the participant (who could consistently
choose Cl).

The opponent never used the potential threat inherent

in the matrix by which he could lower Column's payoff by 20 points
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Figure 7. Mixed-Motive Threat-Vulnerable
Game (Gruder & Duslak, 1973)
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and possibly induce Column to play C2.

The low retialiatory oppon-

ent chose Rl unless the participant chose Cl more than once consecutively, in which case R3 was chosen until the player shifted to C2.
The simulated opponent thereby reduced his own and Column's payoffs
for failure to alternate between Cl and C2 choices.

Such alter-

nating behaviour represented non-exploitative behaviour.

In the

high retaliatory condition, the programme substituted R2 for R3 in
the low retaliatory strategy.

Therefore Column's failure to alter-

nate reduced his total point payoff by'5 points.

At first glance

it would appear that the low and high retaliatory strategies did
not differ in the frequency of retaliation but did differ in the
severity of threat (R2 vs. R3 choices).

No data were presented to

determine whether the two strategies in practice did differ in the
frequency of retaliatory choices.

Of course, these two strategies

did differ in the frequency of retaliation from the nonretaliatory
strategy.

The measure of cooperation was the number of times the

participant chose C2.

Results indicated that the low retaliatory

strategy elicited more cooperative responding than the high retaliatory strategy, which elicited more than the nonretaliatory strategy.
These differences increased over trials.

A second experiment was

conducted in which the severity of retaliation (low or high, as
manipulated structurally), and the presence of retaliation ware
the two variables.

As in Experiment 1, results indicated that no

retaliation elicits fewer cooperative responses than either the
high or low retaliatory strategies.
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In summary, both the Gruder and Duslak (1973) and the Guyer
and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al*, 1976) experiments indicated
that when the effects of a passive noncontingent strategy were compared to those of a contingent more demanding strategy in threatvulnerable games, the former strategy produced a lower frequency of
non-dominant responding and, in the latter study, a lower propensity
to share voluntarily (appease).

Therefore these two strategies

differed with respect to both the frequency and contingency of threat,
making statements about the effects of threat frequency alone tenuous.
Overview of Experimental Design
Guyer and Rapoport (1970) did indicate that the behaviour of
either a Row or a Column player in Game 21 is influenced by the
behaviour of their opponent.

The comparison between this and the

Santi and Wells (1975) study suggested that a change in the behaviour of the Row player may be suspected as having an effect on
the behaviour of the Column player, particularly as measured by
the appeasement propensity, p(C2/RlCl).
The effect of the Row player's behaviour on the Column
player's behaviour was investigated by Gruder and Duslak (1973) and
by Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al,, 1976) who, by placing
the frequency of threat usage by Row under experimental control,
demonstrated that the probability of non-dominant responding by
Column is higher against a Row player who uses threat than against
one who does not.

The probability of making a C2 response after

an RlCl outcome (appeasement) was also shown to be higher against
a more demanding Row player (Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et
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al., 1976).

In both these studies, the passive (100% Rl strategy)

was noncontingent in contrast to the more demanding strategies.
In view of previous Prisoner's Dilemma game research which indicated that contingent strategies produce more cooperative responding
than noncontingent strategies, even when the overall level of programmed cooperative responding is identical (e.g., Crumbaugh &
Evans, 1967; Downing et al., 1975), it is possible that previously
observed differences in Column's behaviour as a function of the
frequency of threat usage by Row, are actually either partially
or wholly attributable to differences in contingency between the
Row strategies.
The primary purpose of the present experiment was to separate
the respective effects of threat frequency and contingency in a
threat-vulnerable game.

A second purpose was to examine the sta-

bility of these effects when strategies were altered in the final
75 trials of the game.

That is, are the effects stable regardless

of which strategy was experienced during the initial 75 trials of
a 150 trial game?

To answer these questions, participants played

against one of nine programmed stragegy sequences;

all possible

pairwise orderings of passive (P), demanding contingent (DC), and
demanding noncontingent (DNC) strategies.

These nine sequences are

placed into a conceptual framework in Figure 8.

"Initial strategy"

refers to the first 75 trials of a 150-trial game.

Cells are

numbered in order to facilitate later discussion of the pairing
of cells for the purpose of yoking the demanding strategies.
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P = Passive Strategy
DC = Demanding Contingent Strategy
DNC = Demanding Noncontingent Strategy

Figure 8. Cells in Experimental Design
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The P strategy consisted of continual Rl responding on the
part of the programmed opponent.

The following response contin-

gencies (as in Guyer and Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al., 1976)
were operative during the administration of the DC strategy:
p(Rl/a single Cl or C2) = 1.00
p(Rl/two consecutive Cl's) = .50
p(R2/two consecutive C2's) = .50
p(R2/three or more consecutive Cl's) = 1.00
The identical response was simultaneously delivered to the participants who received the yoked DNC strategy.
The primary question was whether the frequency of threat
usage or threat contingency (or both) was the critical determinant
of Column's choice behaviour.

This was addressed by a comparison

of the first 75 trials of the initial P (cells 1, 2, and 3 ) ,
initial DC (cells 4, 5, and 6), and the initial DNC (cells 7, 8, and
9) strategies.

This was a one-way analysis of concurrent strategy

effects.
If threat frequency alone is the prime determinant of
Column's behaviour, the P strategy should differ significantly in
its effects from both the DC and DNC strategies which themselves
should not differ.

If this is the case, then the direction of the

findings were expected to be the same as in the Gruder and Duslak
(1973) and the Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976)
studies:

the higher the frequency of threat usage, the higher the

probability of concessions (probability of non-domiant responding
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and appeasement) by Column.
If threat contingency alone is the prime determinant of
Column's behaviour, the DC strategy should differ significantly
from both the DNC and P strategies.
gies should not differ significantly.

However, the DNC and P strateThe DC strategy was expected

to evoke a higher probability of concessions from Column than
either the DNC or P strategies on the basis of the results of
studies using the Prisoner's Dilemma game which indicated that
contingent strategies produced more cooperative responding than
noncontingent strategies having the same overall level of programmed
cooperation (e.g., Crumbaugh & Evans, 1967).
If both threat frequency and threat contingency are important
determinants of Column's behaviour, significant differences were
expected between all comparisons of the three strategies.

If this

is the case, two possible orderings of the results are DC>DNC^P
or P^DNC^DC.

However, the former ordering is a more likely

outcome given the previous results of Gruder and Duslak (1973)
and Guyer and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976).

The finding

that both threat frequency and contingency are important determinants of Column's behaviour would offer an explanation as to why
previous studies have found that demanding strategies produced more
concessions by Column than passive strategies.
Lastly, if neither threat frequency nor contingency affect
Column's behaviour, there should be no significant differences

1
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among all comparisons of the three strategies.

Such an outcome

would be most unlikely given that previous studies do indicate
that passive and demanding strategies differentially affect the
behaviour of the Column player (Gruder & Duslak, 1973; Guyer &
Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al., 1976).
To determine the effects of previous experience with a particular strategy (P, DC, or DNC) on each of the final strategies,
the final 75 trials of all cells were compared to one another in
a 3 (initial strategy) X 3 (final strategy) design.
If previous experience regardless of the particular initial
strategy has no effect upon Column's behaviour, comparisons between
the means of the final strategy conditions should reveal the same
results as the between participants analyses conducted on the first
75 trials. However, if the type of initial strategy experienced
does have an effect upon Column's behaviour which differs as a
function of the particular final strategy, then a significant
initial X final strategy interaction should occur.

That previous

experience does affect the behaviour of players has been demonstrated using the Prisoner's Dilemma game (Harford & Hill, 1967;
Harford & Solomon, 1967; Smith et al., 1975).

No studies have

examined these effects in threat-vulnerable games.

Method
Participants
Ninety male students enrolled in undergraduate courses at
Wilfrid Laurier University during the period January to August
1978, served as participants.

They were randomly assigned to the

nine strategy conditions using a block randomized procedure.
Ten participants had to be replaced because they or their
partners (participants were run in pairs) indicated on the postexperimental questionnaire that they did not accept the experimental
manipulation.

Two such pairs occurred in cell 1.

The others were

unsystematically distributed over three cells.
Overview of Experimental Situation
Two participants were seated in separate rooms which
visually and accoustically isolated them from each other and from
the experimenter.

Each room contained a game console on which

there were two response buttons, a display window (on which the
matrix was placed) a counter which automatically recorded the participant's own scores, and a "go-light."

The label "Player B"

was placed above each participant's go-light.

Each room also con-

tained a tape-recorder.
In order to yoke the DNC strategy condition to the DC
strategy condition for either 75 or 150 trials, the following cells
of the design were run simultaneously:
7, cells 5 and 9, and cells 6 and 8.
comparable rate.
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cells 2 and 3, cells 4 and
All cells were filled at a
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The Game
Game 21 was used rather than Game 19 in order to investigate the possibility that the U6e of threat and the appeasement
propensity are positively related (Guyer & Rapoport, 1970; Santi
& Wells, 1975).

This relationship was also indicated by Guyer

and Gordon (cited in Rapoport et al., 1976).

To facilitate com-

parisons between these studies the assignment of payoffs to the
game as defined by the ordinal ranking of payoffs was identical
to Guyer and Rapoport (1970) and Variant 2 of the Santi and Wells
(1975) study.

The game matrix is presented in Figure 9.

Procedure
As soon as both participants were seated, the experimenter
individually drew their attention to a typed set of instructions
and informed each that he could read along as the instructions
were delivered by the tape-recorder.
tions can be found in Appendix A.

A transcript of the instruc-

Participants were told that the

experiment was concerned with "how people make simple decisions in
a two-person situation which has payoffs."

They were also told

that the payoff depended both "on what you do and what the other
person does."

Following Guyer and Rapoport (1970), all partici-

pants were given an individualistic orientation.

They were told,

"your goal in the game is to make as many points as possible for
yourself without regard to the number of points earned by the other."
Lastly, all participants were informed that, "at the end of the
game, for every 10^ showing on your counter, you will receive lc."
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Player B
(Column)
Cl

R1

X. 20 X 15
8 X. 20 X

R2

X . 6 ^ \ -2
-2 X,^ 15 X.

Player A
(Row)

Figure 9.

C2

Game 21 Matrix
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Participants were probed to ensure that they understood
the-ramifications of making each choice available dependent upon
the other's choices.

This was accomplished by asking two questions:

If you make Response 1 and the other person makes Response
2, how many points do you get. „ . how many points does he get?
If you make Response 2 and the other person makes Response
1, how many points do you get . . . how many does he get?
If a participant answered incorrectly, the experimenter
repeated the instructions and asked the questions once again.
Participants were then asked:

If your counter reads 1430

points, how much money will you receive?
Upon completion of the probe, the game began.
a trial was indicated by a red go-light.

The start of

The participant made a

response by pushing Response 1 or Response 2.

The IBSponses of

both players and the experimenter were recorded by an event recorder.
Feedback on each trial was provided by a 5 sec

illumination of the

appropriate quadrant of each participant's matrix as determined
by the joint choices of the individual participant and the experimenter.

During this 5 sec

visual display, the participant's own

points were automatically accumulated and displayed on a counter.
There was a 5 sec

delay between the termination of feedback and

the onset of the red go-light.

Therefore, the inter-response inter-

val was approximately 11 sec.

There were 150 trials of the game.

Description of Programmed Strategy Sequences
When a DC strategy for either 75 or 150 trials was to be
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delivered, the following response contingencies were operative in
order to conform to the strategy used by Guyer and Gordon (cited
in Rapoport et al., 1976).
p(Rl/a single Cl or C2) » 1.00
p(Rl/two consecutive Cl's) = .50
p(R2/two consecutive Cl's) = .50
p(R2/three or more consecutive Cl's) = 1.00
Programmed responses were delivered on a one-trial lag basis. An
Rl response was always delivered on trial 1.

For example, if on

trials 1 and 2, Cl responses were made by the participant, the
probability of an R2 response being delivered on Trial 3 was .50.
An alternator (Lehigh Valley Electronics, Model No. 24105) was used to determine with a 50/50 probability whether an Rl
or an R2 response was delivered following two consecutive Cl responses on the part of the participant.

The identical response was

simultaneously delivered to the participant in the DNC yoked group.
When two players were present who had been assigned to a condition
receiving the P strategy for either 75 or 150 trials, the experimenter delivered continual Rl responses.

Six of the nine strategy

sequences required a change in strategy.

This began on trial 76.

At the end of the game, all participants were given a postexperimental questionnaire (see Appendix B) which queried each as
to what he thought of the other player and what he thought the experimenter was trying to find out in the experiment.

Once this had

been completed the participants were given cash based on their point
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total.

The maximum any one participant could earn was $3.00.

This

amount was attainable only if the player chose Cl on every trial
against a 150 trial P strategy.

Each participant was also asked

to sign his name and address on an envelope so that at a later date
he would receive a summary of experimental findings.

Care was

taken to impress upon each participant that the procedure of the
experiment should not be divulged until he had received the results.

Results
All analyses, including tests of simple main effects and
multiple comparisons were performed on arcsin transformed data.
This transformation is useful when the means and variances are
proportional and the observations have a binomial distribution
(Kirk, 1968; Winer, 1962).

Inspection of these data suggested that

in fact means and variances were proportional.
Overall Trends in Outcome Frequencies
Table 1 shows the distribution of the four outcomes for the
initial strategy conditions.

These data were derived solely from

the first 75 trials of the initial P, DC and DSC cells.

Table 2

shows the distribution of the four outcomes for the three final
strategy conditions.

These tables are presented to provide an

overview of gross trends in the data.

The following presentation

of these data is intended to serve a descriptive function, the
importance of any observations being contingent upon subsequent
statistical tests which appear in later sections.
Both tables show that the outcomes RlC2 and R2C2 occur infrequently regardless of whether these data are derived from the initial or final strategy conditions.

These two outcomes require a C2

response on the part of the participant.

The Cl response appears

to have been made more frequently as seen in the much higher mean
percentages of the RlCl and R2Cl outcomes.
A second trend is also evident:

69

The occurrence of the RlCl
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Table 1
Mean Percentages of the Four Outcomes for the
Initial P, DC, and DNC Strategy Conditions
Quadrant Outcome
1

2

Natural
(RlCl)

3
Sharing

Threat

Concession

(R1C2)

(R2C1)

(R2C2)

P

84.7

15.3

DC

38.4

12.5

38.4

10.7

DNC

40.6

10.3

40.2

8.9

Note.

Quadrants 3 and 4 are undefined for the Passive strategy
condition.
Table 2
Mean Percentages of the Four Outcomes for the
Final P, DC and DNC Strategy Conditions
Quadrant Outcome
1

2

3

Natural

Sharing

Threat

Concession

(RlCl)

(R1C2)

(R2C1)

(R2C2)

P

89.0

11.0

DC

33.6

18.4

38.8

9.2

DNC

40.6

10.8

41.8

6.8

Note.

Quadrants 3 and 4 are undefined for the Passive strategy
condition.
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outcome is highest in the P strategy condition followed b> the DNC
and DC strategy conditions regardless of whether the strategy condition is final or initial.

Therefore, the C2 response occurs

more frequently in the DC strategy condition than in the other two
strategy conditions.
Initial Strategy Effects
The primary analysis of initial strategy effects across the
first 75 trials was directed toward determining whether one or both
of threat frequency or threat contingency are important determinants
of the Column player's behaviour.
The mean probability of non-dominant responding (C2 responding) in the three initial strategy conditions is presented in
Table 3.

The mean probability of C2 responding was low in all con-

ditions as reflected previously by the overall trends in outcome
frequencies.

A one-way analysis of variance revealed no significant

effect of strategy condition, F(2,87) = 2.68, p>.10.
The probability of non-dominant responding is not as sensitive a measure as the stochastic measures of appeasement, p(C2/RlCl),
and capitulation, p(C2/R2Cl), which are conditionalized on the RlCl
and R2C1 outcomes respectively.
Stochastic measures refer to the probability of a certain
response occurring on trial n given that a certain outcome had
occurred on trial n - 1.
bability is p(Cl/RlCl).

A general way of symbolizing such a proThis represents "the probability of a Cl

response given an RlCl outcome on the previous trial." Precisely
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations of the
Probability of Non-Dominant Responding Across Initial
Strategy Conditions

Strategy Condition

P

DC

DNC

Mean

.153

.232

.192

Standard Deviation

.187

.135

.191
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because these measures are conditionalized they more directly "tap"
the responses of the Column player to the behaviour of the Row
player.

Four outcomes are possible in any 2 X 2 game.

For any one

stochastic measure to be defined for a player, the frequency of a
particular quadrant outcome must exceed the criterion number (3 or
more).

It was necessary to estimate conditional probabilities when

the number of opportunities (i.e., quadrant outcomes) was insufficient.

The mean conditional probability of those Column players for

whom the number of quadrant outcomes was sufficient was assigned to
those players for whom the number of quadrant outcomes was insufficient.

The effect of estimation was considered slight.

For ex-

ample, only 1/90 observations for the appeasement propensity were
estimated (1.1%) before the analysis of initial strategy effects
was performed.

Due to the small number of estimations made with

respect to the appeasement, p(C2/RlCl), and capitulation, p(C2/R2Cl),
measures, it is unlikely that the concomitant reduction of withincell variances resulted in significant positive bias in the analyses
of variance.
The very infrequent occurrence of the R1C2 and R2C2 outcomes which are necessary to obtain reliable estimates of the generosity, p(C2/RlC2), and doublecross, p(Cl/R2c2), propensities made
estimation prohibitive.

During the initial 75 trials, the frequency

of the R1C2 outcome did not exceed the criterion number for 34 out
of a total of 90 participants.

The frequency of the R2C2 outcome

did not exceed the criterion number for 15 out of a total of 60

74
participants.

Descriptive statistics for these propensities across

the initial strategy conditions are presented in Appendix C.
Appeasement propensities, p(C2/RlCl), in the initial strategy conditions appear in Table 4.

A one-way analysis of variance

revealed a significant effect of initial strategy condition, F(2,87)
« 8.33, p<.01.

A Newman-Keuls test indicated that the propensity

for appeasement was significantly higher, j>(.05, in the DC strategy condition than in both the P and DNC strategy conditions which
themselves did not differ significantly, j>}.05.

That the DNC

strategy condition did not differ significantly from the P strategy condition is direct evidence that the frequency of threat alone
is net the prime determinant of the Column player's propensity to
appease.

Rather, the analysis indicates that contingency is the

prime determinant of the Column player's propensity to appease
during the initial 75 trials of the game.
A comparison of the effects of the DC and DNC strategy conditions on the capitulation propensity, p(C2/R2Cl), also tended to
support the finding that the contingency of threat affects the Column player's behaviour.

Capitulation propensities in the initial

strategy conditions appear in Table 5.
for the p strategy.

Capitulation is not defined

A one-way analysis of variance revealed a sig-

nificant effect of initial strategy condition, F(l,58) = 11.18,
p^.01.

The capitulation propensity was significantly higher in

the DC strategy condition than in the DNC strategy condition.

These

two strategy conditions differed only in the contingency of threat.
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Table 4
Means and Standard Deviations of the
Appeasment Propensity, p(C2/RlCl), Across Initial
Strategy Conditions

Strategy Condition
P

DC

Mean

.111

.255

.114

Standard Deviation

.138

.231

.106

Note.

DNC

1.1% of the appeasement data is estimated (1/90 observations).
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Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations of the
Capitulation Propensity, p(c2/R2Cl), Across Initial
Strategy Conditions

Strategy Condition
DC

DNC

Mean

.342

.157

Standard Deviation

.234

.163

Note.

3.3% of the capitulation data is estimated (2/60 observations).
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Therefore, the observed difference is attributable to the threat
contingency variable.
The results of the analysis of initial strategy effects
leads to the tentative conclusion that threat contingency alone
is the prime determinant of the Column player's behaviour, particularly the propensity to appease.
Final Strategy Effects
The purpose of these analyses was to examine the stability
of the above results when participants have been exposed to the
various initial strategy conditions treated as treatments.

Only

data derived from the final 75 trials were subjected to analyses.
The mean probability of C2 responding during the final 75
trials is presented in Table 6 as a function of both initial and
final strategy conditions.

Regardless of the initial strategy con-

dition, the mean probability of C2 responding was highest in the
final DC strategy condition followed by the final DNC and P strategy
conditions in that order.

The mean probability of occurrence of

non-dominant responding associated with the final P, DC and DNC
strategy conditions were .110, .276, and .176 respectively.

A

3 X 3 analysis of these data revealed a significant main effect of
final strategy, F(2,81) =8.27, p <.01 (see Appendix D far ANOVA Table).
A Newman-Keuls test indicated that all comparisons within this main
effect were significant, jg^.05.

There was no significant effect

of initial strategy, F(2,81) = 1.54, j>^>.10, and also no significant
initial X final strategy interaction, F < 1 .

These results indicate
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Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations

of the

Probability of Non-Dominant Responding as a Function of
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions

Initial Strategy

Final Strategy
p

DC

DNC

.081
(.195)

.205
(.137)

.125
(.135)

DC

.053
(.142)

.343
(.091)

.189
(-153)

DNC

.195
(.245)

.279
(.311)

.215
(.238)

*Standard deviations in Parentheses

that both threat frequency and contingency are important determinants of the Column player's probability of non-dominant responding during the final 75 trials of the game. This appears to be
independent of the initial strategy conditions.
Only two of the more sensitive stochastic measures could be
examined:

appeasement, p(C2/RlCl), and capitulation, p(C2/R2Cl).

During the final 75 trials, the number of R1C2 outcomes did not
exceed the criterion number (3 or more) for 42 out of a total of
90 participants.

Therefore, the generosity propensity, p(C2/RlC2),

was not submitted to analysis. With respect to the doublecross
propensity, p(Cl/R2C2), the number of R2C2 outcomes did not
exceed the criterion number for 22 out of a total of 60 participants.

Descriptive statistics for these two propensities as a

function of initial and final strategy conditions are presented
in Appendix E.
The appeasement propensities during the final 75 trials are
presented in Table 7 as a function of both initial and final strategy conditions.

The propensities of the final DC and DNC strategy

conditions are similar and both are higher than the propensities
of the final P strategy conditions.

These data were submitted to a

3 X 3 analysis of variance (see Appendix F for ANOVA Table).

This

analysis revealed a significant main effect of final strategy condition, _F(2,81) = 6.42, p_<.01.

A Newman-Keuls test indicated that

the DC and DNC strategy conditions differed significantly from the
P strategy condition, p<.05, but not from each other.

This findin

suggests that during the final 75 trials, threat frequency alone
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Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations* of the
Appeasement Propensity, p(C2/RlCl), as a Function of
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions

Initial Strategy

Final Strategy Condition

Condition

P

DC

DNC

P

.105
(.240)

.143
(.117)

.155
(.134)

DC

.039
(.089)

.389
(.315)

.316
(.319)

DNC

.135
(.168)

.181
(.162)

.194
(.202)

Note.

2.2% of the appeasement data is estimated (2/90 observations).

* Standard deviations in parentheses
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is the prime determinant of this measure of the Column player's behaviour rather than threat contingency which exerted an effect
during the initial 75 trials.

There was no significant main effect

of initial strategy condition, F(2,81) = 1.57, _p^ .10, and also no
significant initial X final strategy interaction, F(4,81) = 2.06,
P/.10.

Therefore, participant's levels of appeasement during the

final 75 trials appeared to be independent of the strategy condition
experienced during the initial 75 trials.
The capitulation data during the final 75 trials as a function of initial and final strategy conditions are presented in
Figure 10.

These data were submitted to a 3 X 2 analysis of var-

iance to determine delayed strategy effects (see Appendix G for
ANOVA Table).

The analysis revealed a significant main effect for

initial strategy, F(2,54) = 4.29, p<.05, a significant main effect
for final strategy, F(l,54) = 14.61, J J ^ . O I , and a significant initial X final strategy interaction, F(2,54) = 5.36, p^.01.

The

interaction is displayed in Figure 10.' A test of simple main effects revealed a significant difference, _£<". 05, for the capitulations propensity between the final DC and final DNC strategy conditions when the initial strategy condition was P or DC, but not when
the initial strategy condition was DNC, F < 1 .

When the initial

strategy condition was P or DC, the capitulation propensity was
significantly higher in the final DC strategy condition.

Therefore,

there was an effect of threat contingency on the capitulation propensity when the initial 75 trials were either P or DC.

The test

INITIAL X FINAL
STRATEGY INTERACTION

5-

Rnal DC

2-

Final DNC

0

DC
I N I T I A L STRATEGY

DNC
OO

Figure 10. Initial X Final Strategy Interaction for the
Capitulation Propensity,

p(C2/R2C1)
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of simple main effects also indicated that the level of capitulation
in the final DC strategy condition varied significantly, p^.01,
as a function of the initial strategy condition, while the level
of capitulation in the final DNC strategy condition did not significantly vary across initial strategy conditions, F < 1 . A NewmanKeuls test indicated that the level of capitulation in the initial
DC-final DC strategy condition (.527) was significantly higher,
p^.05, than the capitulation levels of both the initial P-final
DC (.262) and initial DNC-final DC (.201) strategy conditions which
themselves did not differ significantly, p>.05.

The lack of an

effect of threat contingency when the initial strategy condition
was DNC may be attributable to participants in the initial DNC final DC condition simply not detecting the change in contingency.
Questionnaire Data
A factor analysis of the 24-item postexperimental questionnaire was carried out in order to reduce these data to a set of
underlying dimensions or factors.

The factor scores were subjected

to a 3 X 3 analysis of variance to determine whether differences in
questionnaire responses were attributable to the particular strategy
sequence experienced.
Principal factoring with iterations generated seven factors
from the 24 items.

These factors were orthogonally rotated using

a varimax solution (Nie et al. , 1975).

The first three factors ac-

counted for 76.7% of the total variance (45.9%, 21.5% and 9.2% respectively).

Factor 4 ("Cleanliness") accounted for an additional
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7.6% of the variance, but was not viewed as related to game-playing
behaviour.

Therefore, only the factor scores for the first three

factors were submitted to an analysis of variance.

Table 8 pre-

sents the items which had factor loadings greater than or equal to
.50 on the three factors.
Factor 1 was labelled "Evaluative" on the assumption that
the items reflected the participant's impression of the other's
general disposition as revealed during the course of the game.
Items representing Factor 2 appear to be related to the participant's
judgement of the other's game-playing style or ability and this factor was therefore labelled "style".

Factor 3 ("Calmness") was so

labelled because of the apparent nature of the two items "calmagitated" and "tense-relaxed".
Factor 1, 2 and 3 scores were submitted to separate analyses
of variance which indicated a significant final strategy main
effect for Factor 3 scores only, F(2,81) = 3.35, p<.05 (see
Appendix H for ANOVA Table).

The mean Factor 3 scores for the final

strategy main effect were 0.3495, -0.2200, and -0.1294 for the final
P, DC and DNC strategy conditions respectively.

A Newman-Keuls test

revealed that opponents using a passive strategy during the last 75
trials were perceived as being significantly more calm than opponents using either a DC or DNC strategy which themselves did not
significantly differ, p>.05.

With the exception of Factor 3, it

appears that the Column player's perception of the opponent does
not vary significantly as a function of the opponent's game-playing
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Table 8
Items Associated with Derived Factors
Factor Loading

Item
Factor 1; Evaluative
Warm-CoId

.51

Pleasant-Unpleasant

.69

Honest-Dishonest

.71

Untrustworthy-Trustworthy

.64

Good-Bad

.72

Nice-Awful

.78

Hostile-Friendly

.83

Peaceful-Ferocious

.50

Happy-Sad

.58

Factor 2: Style
Intelligent-Unintelligent

60

Weak-Strong

53

Cowardly-Brave

61

Active-Passive

84

Competitive-Noncompetitive

73

Factor 3:

Calmness

Calm-Agitated

85

Tense-Relaxed

62
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behaviour in this experiment.
Supplementary Analyses
Three one-way analyses of variance for the final 75 trials
of the game were performed on each of the following three dependent measures across cells 1, 5 and 9 in which participants had
experienced one of the P, DC or DNC strategies for the entire 150
trial game:

(a) the probability of non-dominant responding,

(b) the appeasement propensity, and (c) the capitulation propensity.

Descriptive data for these supplementary analyses are pre-

sented in Table 9.

All data were arcsin transformed prior to ana-

lyses.
The analysis of the probability of non-dominant responding
data revealed a significant effect of strategy condition, F(2,27)
= 6.30, p<.01.

A Newman-Keuls test indicated that the probability

of non-dominant responding was significantly lower, j><.05, in
the P strategy condition than in both the DC and DNC strategy conditions which themselves did not differ significantly, j>>.05,
suggesting that the frequency of threat is the prime determinant of
final C2 responding over the final 75 trials of the game.
A significant effect of strategy condition was also revealed
on both the more sensitive appeasement and capitulation propensities, F(2,27) = 4.29, p<.05, and F(l,18) = 18.31, p<.01, respectively.

A Newman-Keuls test indicated that the appeasement propen-

site was significantly lower, j> <,. 05, in the P strategy condition
than in the DC strategy condition but was not significantly lower
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Table 9
Means and Standard Deviations* of the Probability
of Non-Dominant Responding, Appeasement and Capitulation
Propensities Across the Final 75 Trials of Cells 1, 5, and 9

Strategy Condition

Dependent Measure
p

DC

DNC

Probability of NonDominant Responding

.081
(.195)

.343
(.091)

.215
(.238)

Appeasement Propensity

.105
(.240)

.389
(.315)

.194
(.202)

.527
(.189)

.179
(.179)

Capitulation Propensity**

* Standard deviations in parentheses
**10% of the capitulation data is estimated

(2/20 observations)
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than in the DNC strategy condition, _p> .05.

The DC and DNC strategy

conditions were only marginally significantly different, p <". 10.
The capitulation propensity was significantly higher in the DC
strategy condition than in the DNC strategy condition.

For the un-

changed strategy conditions, it appears that when two strategies
differ with respect to both threat frequency and contingency, there
is a significant difference in the Column player's propensity to
appease.

Discussion
The primary purpose of this experiment was to separate the
respective effects of threat frequency and threat contingency in
a threat-vulnerable game.

A second purpose was to examine the

stability of these effects when strategies were altered in the final
75 trials of the game.
The essential features of any operational definition of
threat include (a) the communication of an intention to do something detrimental to the interests of the other (Deutsch & Krauss,
1962; Tedeschi, Bonoma, & Brown, 1971), and (b) the ability to carry
out the threatened punishment contingent upon noncompliance by the
other (Black & Higbee, 1973; Kelley, 1965; Tedeschi et al., 1971).
In explicit threat situations, communication of such contingent
threats is achieved by sending a message in the form of an if-then
statement.

Punishment is exacted by taking points from the other

player's total.

In tacit (structural) threat situations, communi-

cation of such threats is made via choice behaviour.
In Game 21, the operational definition of threat (an R2
choice) is consistent with the view held by game theorists that
threat is a strategic move which is used by a player with the intention of influencing another player's behaviour (Schelling, 1960).
The Row Player can induce the other player to shift to C2 if the
other can be made to see that it is to his advantage to do so rather
than to suffer the consequences of the Row player shifting.
ducement is the potential use of an R2 choice.
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In-

If, after a number
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of Cl responses by the Column player, the Row player uses threat,
it can be said that the use of the R2 choice communicates a contingency which may influence the behaviour of the threatened player.
In the present study, a Row player who never used threat
was said to be playing a passive strategy.

The Row player was a

passive player in the sense that he was continually and unconditionally cooperative

He allowed the Column player to obtain his

most preferred payoff indefinitely while he himself did not (a) attempt to induce a shift, or (b) exact punishment for failure to
shift, in order to obtain his own most preferred payoff.

Such non-

use of the power to exert control over his own payoffs is identical
to the behaviour of pure pacifists in other threat-vulnerable games
(Gruder & Duslak, 1973; Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al.,
197 6; Rapoport et al., 1971).
A programmed strategy of 100% cooperative responding in a
Prisoner's Dilemma game is also a passive strategy in that the unconditionally cooperative player allows the other to obtain his most
preferred payoff on every trial.

There is, however, no threat in

a Prisoner's Dilemma game because the use of the individually rational
choice (the payoff on any trial) does not serve to induce a shift
on the part of the other player.

This difference in structure bet-

ween the two games may account for the finding that, in the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the passive 100% cooperative strategy evokes more
cooperative responding on the part of participants than very low
levels of programmed cooperation, whereas in Game 21, the passive
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strategy evokes less "sharing" behaviour than the more demanding
strategies.
In both non-matrix gaming situations (e.g., Shure et al.,
1965; Vincent & Tindell, 1969), and in threat-vulnerable game studies (Gruder & Duslak, 1973; Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et
al., 1976), the pacifist strategy has not been successful in
inducing cooperation.

In threat-vulnerable games, when the passive

noncontingent strategy was compared to the more demanding and
contingent strategies, the passive strategy evoked both a lower
probability of non-dominant responding by the Column player and a
lower probability of appeasement.
The inclusion of the demanding but noncontingent (DNC)
strategy in the present study, was meant to provide a method for
determining whether threat frequency or threat contingency is the
prime determinant of the Column player's behaviour.

By extension,

the use of the DNC strategy also permits the examination of the
stability of these effects under three conditions (prior exposure
to the three initial strategies).
Overall Results
In general, Column players in the present study were not
predisposed to deviate frequently from the rational choice on any
single trial of the game. The overall level of the probability of
non-dominant responding was .189 across all conditions.

That Cl is

the preferred choice of the Column players is further supported
by the doublecross propensity, p(Cl/R2C2), which was higher than all
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other propensities where such comparisons are possible in the present study.

Previous studies using threat-vulnerable games in

either real play or simulated opponent situations have found similar results (Gruder & Duslak, 1973; Guyer & Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al., 1976; Guyer and Rapoport, 1970; Rapoport et al., 1971;
Santi & Wells, 1975).

However, both the probability of non-dominant

msponding and the more sensitive stochastic measures were affected
by the frequency and the contingency of threat.
The present data indicated that both threat frequency and
threat contingency had significant effects on various aspects of the
Column player's behaviour.

Threat frequency was a determinant of

both the Column player's probability of non-dominant responding as
well as the propensity to appease during the final 75 trials of the
game.

Threat contingency affected both the levels of appeasement

and capitulation during the initial 75 trials, as well as the probability of non-dominant responding during the final 75 trials.

In

addition, an effect of threat contingency on the capitulation measure
during the final 75 trials was found which was dependent upon the
strategy condition experienced during the initial 75 trials. Overall, the pattern of results suggests that the effects of threat contingency can be observed at earlier points in the interaction sequence
than the effects of threat frequency.
Delayed Strategy Effects
Only one significant delayed strategy effect was found in the
present study.

The interaction of initial and final strategies for
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the capitulation propensity resulted from a significant delayed
strategy effect for the final DC strategy condition.

Specifically,

the capitulation propensity for the final DC strategy condition was
not significantly different for the initial P - final DC and the initial DNC - final DC conditions but both of these differed significantly from the initial DC - final DC strategy condition.

This

finding is consistent with previous research using the Prisoner's
Dilemma game (Oskamp, 1970; Sermat, 1967), where it was found that
the current contingent nature of tit-for-tat strategy overrides the
effects of prior exposure to both the noncontingent 0% and 100%
cooperative strategies.
This interaction indicated that there was an effect of threat
contingency (in terms of the final DNC vs. the final DC strategy
comparison) on the capitulation propensity when the initial strategy
had been P or DC but not when the initial strategy condition had
been DNC. Two explanations for the lack of an effect of threat contingency when the initial strategy condition had been DNC are possible:

(a) The addition of threat contingency in the shift from

the initial DNC to the final DC strategy was not discernible; or
(b) Although the Column player may have been sensitive to the shift,
psychological factors such as "getting back" at the previously inconsistent opponent by responding dominantly, regardless of the contingencies of the current DC strategy, were coming into play.

In

future research, the former interpretation might be verified if,
at the point of the shift, a few trials of sequential Rl responding
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or an explicit communication concerning a change in strategy were
delivered such that the Column player may be sensitized to the shift.
If the discernibility of the shift had been enhanced, perhaps an
effect of threat contingency might have been found when the initial
strategy condition had been DNC as well.
The interaction also indicated that the Column player's behaviour during the final DNC strategy condition was independent of
the initial strategy condition.

The explanation for such an outcome

may lie in the programme's rules for feedback.

In all DC strategy

conditions, once an R2Cl outcome had occurred, the only way to reestablish the RlCl outcome was to shift to C2 (i.e., capitulate).
If the participant repeated the Cl response, R2 responses continued.
In all DNC strategy conditions, to shift to C2 after the R2C1 outcome would not necessarily guarantee the re-establishment of the RlCl
outcome.

In fact, for these participants, deviation from the Cl

response could result unpredictably in the R2C2 outcome, giving
the player his least preferred payoff.

Given the undesirable conse-

quences of deviations from Cl in all DNC strategy conditions, the
finding that the capitulation propensities for the final DNC strategy condition were determined by the current noncontingent nature
of the DNC strategy independent of initial strategy conditions appears
reasonable.
The effects of threat contingency and threat frequency are
difficult to separate for the capitulation measure because this
measure is not defined for the passive strategy.

However, data pre-
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sented above suggest that the contingency rather than the frequency of threat during the initial 75 trials affected the level
of capitulation for the final DC strategy condition.

Therefore,

stating that the capitulation measure is sensitive to the contingency
of threat does not mean that threat frequency has no role whatsoever
in determining the propensity to capitulate.

However, the present

data failed to show any delayed effect of threat frequency on capitulation, while at the same time showing a strong delayed effect of
threat contingency.
Previous research using Game 19 (Guyer 6c Gordon, cited in
Rapoport et al., 1976) has shown that two contingent strategies,
differing only in the frequency of R2, will produce very similar
levels of capitulation indicating again that threat frequency may
not be an important determinant of the Column player's propensity to
capitulate.

On this basis, it might be suggested that the lower

propensity to capitulate found in real play situations versus simulated opponent situations may be attributable to the lack of consistent contingent use of R2 by the bona fide Row players rather than
the concomitant lower frequency of R2 in real play situations (Guyer
and Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al., 1976; Guyer and Rapoport, 1970;
Rapoport et al., 1971; Santi and Wells, 1975, Variant 2).
The effects of threat frequency and threat contingency can be
separated with respect to the appeasement and the probability of nondominant responding measures as well.

Previous research which com-

pared two contingent and demanding strategies to the P strategy
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(Gruder and Duslak, 1973; Guyer and Gordon, cited in Rapoport et al. ,
1976) found that the P strategy evoked both a lower propensity of
appeasement and a lower probability of non-dominant responding.

The

findings of the present study were consistent with this research in
that both during the initial and final 75 trials, the P strategy
evoked a significantly lower propensity to appease than the DC strategy.

Although threat contingency was the prime determinant of

the Column player's propensity to appease across the initial strategy conditions, threat frequency was the prime determinant
behaviour across the final strategy conditions and this was independent of the strategy condition experienced during the initial 75
trials.

Thus, the results for the appeasement propensity were con-

sistent with the suggestion that appeasement is sensitive to differences in the Row player's behaviour (Guyer and Rapoport, 1970; Santi
and Wells, 1975) but the results further revealed that this measure
of the Column player's behaviour was affected by both the frequency
and contingency of threat, albeit at different points in the interaction.
While both threat frequency and threat contingency affected
the probability of non-dominant responding during the final 75
trials of the game, independent of the initial strategy condition,
this measure was not as sensitive as the stochastic measures.

Given

that participants in the DC strategy conditions tended to both appease and capitulate more frequently than in oilier ;; I r ;i («'KV <<>nclll IOIIM.
the significant difference in the proUibi I i t y ok non-dominant lespoti-

xng between the final DC and final DNC strategy conditions could be
expected.

That the final P and final DNC conditions differed sig-

nificantly as well can only be attributed to the current differences
in the frequency of threat.

Thus, both threat contingency and

threat frequency were important determinants of overall C2 responding.
In summary, on those measures for which the effects of threat
frequency and threat contingency could be separated, it was found
that both variables were important determinants of the Column player'
behaviour.

That response contingency is an important determinant of

behaviour in Prisoner's Dilemma games has been noted by previous
researchers (Crumbaugh 6e Evans, 1967; Downing et al., 1975; Downing
6c Ritter, Note 3; Kahn et al., 1971; McNeel, 1973).

The effects of

threat contingency were pronounced for the capitulation measure,
were sequence dependent, but did not definitely rule out the possibility that threat frequency may also play a role in determining the
levels of capitulation for Column players.
Postexperimental Questionnaire
As noted above, the present findings verified the results of
previous studies in that the passive strategy in threat-vulnerable
games was not successful for inducing cooperation.
The explanation for such findings usually focuses on the
attributions an exploiter might make about his victim (Gruder and
Duslak, 1973; Swingle, 1974).

Participants' behaviour in games has

been shown to be affected by the personality dispositions which are
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attributed to the opponent (Marlowe, Gergen, and Doob, 1966) and by
their perception of the opponent's intentions (e.g., to be fair or
exploitative, etc.) at the onset of the game (Gruder, 1971;
Murdoch, 1967).

A passive opponent who leaves himself open to con-

tinued exploitation may be perceived as foolish or incompetent in
comparison to an opponent who responds by removing himself from the
vulnerable position.

An undonditionally cooperative opponent is

perceived in a very similar light (Swingle, 1974).
No support was found in the present study for such an
explanation of the differences in behaviour between the DC and P
strategy conditions.

Only Factor 3 ("Calmness") was found to diff-

erentiate the demanding strategies from the passive strategy.

This

finding appears quite reasonable given that "Calmness" would seem to
be most easily inferred from the frequency with which an opponent
uses the R2 choice.

Hence, although the participant's behaviour

differed as a function of the simulated opponent's behaviour, his
perception of the other was relatively quite stable.

Evidently, an

exploiter can continue to take advantage of a "victim" without necessarily attributing to that individual any greater or lesser degree
of intelligence, honesty, trustworthiness, et cetera.

Hence, con-

trary to previous reports it appears that attribution of incompetence
and foolishness are not necessary conditions for an exploiter to continue taking advantage of a passive opponent (Gruder 6e Duslak, 1973;
Gruder, 1971; Marlowe et al., 1966).

Conclusions
The following are the major contributions which this
research has made to the experimental literature on threat-vulnerable
games.
1.

The present study replicates previous findings that a demanding
contingent strategy is more effective than a passive strategy
in gaining concessions from the Column player.

2.

The present study goes beyond previous work in demonstrating
that two separable aspects of the demanding contingent strategy,
namely the patterning of threat and the frequency of threat,
both make independent contributions to the gaining of concessions
from the Column player.

However, a simple statement of the

relative importance of these two aspects is difficult to make
because their relative effectiveness depends both on the
specific dependent variable and the point in the interaction
sequence which is examined.
3.

The effects of strategy shifts were also complicated by the
nature of the dependent variable considered.

For the capitu-

lation propensity, the effects observed during the last 75
trials depended upon the strategy experienced during the first
75 trials. However, for both the probability of non-dominant
responding and the appeasement propensity, the effects observed
during the last 75 trials were a function of the strategy
conditions in effect at that time and did not depend upon the
type of strategy experienced during the first 75 trials. These
99

100
differential strategy shift effects for the appeasement
and capitulation measures are consistent with previous research
which indicated that appeasement may be more responsive to shifts
in strategy on the part of the Row player than capitulation.
4.

The high level of "exploitation" noted in the passive strategy
condition is entirely consistent with previous reports in the
literature.

Gruder and Duslak (1973) suggested that the

failure to respond to exploitation results in the exploiter
attributing foolishness or incompetence to the passive
opponent and that these attributions lead the exploiter to
continue to take advantage of the passive "victim."

Data

obtained from the postexperimental questionnaire lend no
support to this hypothesis.

In fact, they indicate that

the attribution of negative traits is not a necessary condition for an exploiter to continue taking advantage of a
passive opponent.
5.

Future research might best be directed toward the examination
of the respective effects of threat frequency and threat
contingency when different shifts in strategy conditions
are undertaken.

Researchers interested in such shifts might

be advised to (a) ensure that a shift from a noncontingent
yoked control strategy to a contingent strategy is preceded
by a number of predetermined responses or an explicit communication which would ensure that such a shift is perceived by
participants, and (b)

include stochastic measures in any
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study because of their evident sensitivity to the behaviour of
the other player.

Under these experimental conditions it

would be possible to parse out the separate effects of threat
frequency and contingency when shifts in strategy are pronounced.
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Instructions
Please read along with and pay close attention to the
following instructions as they are presented.

We are interested

in how people make simple decisions in a two-person situation which
has payoffs.

The payoff you get depends both on what you do and

what the other person does.

On the table in frontof you is a panel

with two buttons marked "Response 1" and Response 2", a counter
marked "Your points", a red "Go-light", and a display window.

You

will notice that the display window has a piece of paper attached
to it which is divided into 4 boxes.

The numbers in red are the

number of points you win or lose; the numbers in black are the
number of points that the other player wins or loses.
The game is played as follows:
the other is "Player B".

One of you is "Player A" and

To find out whether you are "Player A" or

"Player B" look at the panel in frontof you.

Above the red "Go-

light" you will see a lable which indicates whether you are "Player
A" or "Player B".
When the red light on your panel goes on, push response
button 1 or 2.

Be sure to make your response as soon as the red

light goes on and do not push the response buttons at any other time.
The person you are playing against will make choices on his panel
at the same time you do.
payoffs.

The numbers in the 4 boxes indicate the

For example, if Player A pushes Response 1 and Player B

pushes Response 1, the upper left-hand box of your display window

will light up, showing that Player A has won 8 points and Player B
has won 20 points.

If Player A pushes Response 2 and Player B

pushes Response 2, the lower right-hand box of your display window
wi 11 light up, showing that Player A wins 15 points and Player B
loses 2 points.
If Player A pushes Response 1 and Player B pushes Response
2, the upper right-hand box of your display window will light up,
showing that Player A wins 20 points and Player B wins 15 points.
If Player A pushes Response 2 and Player B pushes Response 1, the
lower left-hand box of your display window will light up showing
that Player A loses 2 points and Player wins 6 points.
Remember, the numbers in red show the number of points you
get; the numbers in black show the number of points that the other
person gets.

You will both start the game with 50 points.

The

points you win or lose will automatically be added to or subtracted
from this number. After you and the other player have made a response and one of the boxes lights up, you may look at the counter
to your right to see how many points you have accumulated.

Your

goal in the game is to make as many points as possible for yourself
without regard to the number of points earned by the other.

There

will be a number of trials in this experiment, but you will not
know in advance how many there will be.

At the end of the game, for

every 10 points showing on your counter, you will receive 1 cent.
I will now ask each of you a couple of questions to make sure
that you have understood the game.

Please remain seated.

I will
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be with you in a moment.
Turn the tape recorder off by pressing the stop button.

APPENDIX B

POSTEXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE

»

Here xs a list of word pairs whxch might be used to describe
other people.

This is a "person perception task" - that is, we are

interested in the impressions participants in this experiment form
of each other based on the games you have just finished playing.
Thus, we would like your impressions of the other participant in
this experiment.

Please place a check mark on the appropriate line

for each pair of adjectives.
You will not see each other again in this experiment, and
your ratings will be kept confidential, of course.

So please mark

down how you really feel.

WARM
SELFISH
REPUTABLE
INTELLIGENT
WEAK

: COLD
: GENEROUS
: DISREPUTABLE
: UNINTELLIGENT
: STRONG

CRUEL

: KIND

YOUNG

: OLD

DIRTY
CALM

_: CLEAN
: AGITATED

PLEASANT

: UNPLEASANT

COWARDLY

: BRAVE

ACTIVE

: PASSIVE

HONEST

: DISHONEST

UNTRUSTWORTHY

: TRUSTWORTHY

PEACEFUL
TENSE
GOOD
UNFAIR
NICE
HOSTILE
HAPPY
COMPETITIVE
BEAUTIFUL
UNSOCIABLE

FEROCIOUS
RELAXED
BAD
FAIR
AWFUL
FRIENDLY
SAD
NONCOMPETITIVE
UGLY
SOCIABLE

Do you have any additional comments concerning the other participants in this experiment?

What do you think the experimenter was trying to find out in this
experiment?

APPENDIX C

GENEROSITY AND DOUBLECROSS PROPENSITIES
ACROSS INITIAL STRATEGY CONDITIONS

Table A

Means and Standard Deviations of the
Generosity Propensity, p(C2/RlC2), Across Initial
Strategy Conditions

Strategy Condition
P

DC

DNC

Mean

.427 (19) a

.241 (21)

.522 (16)

Standard Deviation

.213

.193

.478

Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants
for whom the number of quadrant outcomes exceeded the criterion
(3 or more).

Table B

Means and Standard Deviations of the
Doublecross Propensity, p(Cl/R2C2) Across Initial
Strategy Conditions

Strategy Condition
DC

DNC

Mean

.579 (25) a

.673 (20)

Standard Deviation

.241

.180

Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants for
whom the number of quadrant outcomes exceeded the criterion (3 or
more).

APPENDIX D

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE
PROBABILITY OF NON-DOMINANT RESPONDING

Table C
Analysis of Variance of the Probability of Non-Dominant
Responding as a Function of the I n i t i a l and Final
Strategy Conditions

df

Source

SS

A (Initial Strategy)

.913

2

.457

B (Final Strategy)

4.901

2

2.451

A X B Interaction

1.091

4

.273

24.015

81

.296

Error (Between)

*£ <• 01

MS

F
1.54
8.27*

.92

APPENDIX E
GENEROSITY AND DOUBLECROSS PROPENSITIES AS A
FUNCTION OF THE INITIAL AND FINAL STRATEGY CONDITIONS

Table D
Means and Standard Deviations of the
Generosity Propensity, p(C2/RlC2), as a Function of
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions

Final Strategy Condition[

Initial Strategy
Condition

P

DC

DNC

P
Mean

.362 (3) a

.484 (5)

.360 (4)

Standard Deviation

.156

.356

.257

Mean

.574 (2)

.230 (9)

.456 (6)

Standard Deviation

.104

.206

.341

Mean

.510 (5)

.581 (6)

.438 (8)

Standard Deviation

.333

.364

.338

DC

DNC

Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants for
whom the number of quadrant outcomes exceeded the criterion (3 or
more).

Table E

Means and Standard Deviations of the
Doublecross Propensity, p(Cl/R2C2), as a Function of
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions

Initial Strategy
Condition

Final Strategy Condition

DC

DNC

P
Mean

.695 (6) a

.653 (7)

Standard Deviation

.383

.248

Mean

.776 (9)

.647 (6)

Standard Deviation

.193

.225

.599 (5)

.681 (5)

.309

.180

DC

DNC
Mean
Standard Deviation

3.

Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants for
whom the number of quadrant outcomes exceeded the criterion (3 or
more).

APPENDIX F

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE FOR THE
APPEASEMENT PROPENSITY

Table F
Analysis of Variance of the Appeasement Propensity,
p(C2/RlCl), as a Function of the
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions

df

Source

!§

A (Initial Strategy)

.970

2

.485

B (Final Strategy)

3.968

2

1.984

A X B Interaction

2.543

4

.636

25.006

81

.309

Error (Between)

*p <. 01

MS

F
1.57
6.42*
2.06

APPENDIX G
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
FOR THE CAPITULATION PROPENSITY

Table G

Analysis of Variance of the Capitulation Propensity,
p(C2/R2Cl), as a Function of the
Initial and Final Strategy Conditions

Source

SS

df

MS

A (Initial Strategy)

1.970

2

.985

B (Final Strategy)

3.359

1

3.359

14.61**

A X B Interaction

2.465

2

1.232

5.36**

12.410

54

.230

Error (Between)

*p <. 05
**p <.01

4.29*

APPENDIX H

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE TABLE
FOR SCORES ON THE THIRD FACTOR

142

Table H
Analysis of Variance for Scores on the Third Factor

Source

SS

df

MS

A (Initial Strategy)

1.276

2

.638

B (Final Strategy)

5.620

2

2.810

A X B Interaction

1.646

4

.412

67.836

81

.837

Error (Between)

* p<.05

.762
3.355*
.492

